Showing posts with label policy processes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label policy processes. Show all posts

Monday, 24 November 2014

Innovation choices in the face of uncertainty

Innovation-Walport-report
Professor Andy Stirling writes chapter in the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser’s inaugural report

Sir Mark Walport today launches his first ever annual report as UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Innovation: Managing risk not avoiding it, which includes a chapter written by Professor Andy Stirling, Co-Director of the ESRC-funded STEPS Centre, based at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) of the University of Sussex.

In his contributory chapter, Making choices in the face of uncertainty: towards innovation democracy? Professor Stirling criticises the tendency in conventional debates on new technologies, to treat supporters as being simply ‘pro innovation’ and critics generally ‘anti-science’. Such language can be routinely heard being used, for instance, in controversies over GM foods, new chemicals or nuclear power.

According to Prof. Stirling: “The problem is that this misses the single most important point about innovation. Like other areas of policy – the key issues are about choosing between alternatives. To reduce this to simply being ‘for’ or ‘against’ the particular choice favoured by the most powerful interests is both irrational and anti-democratic”.

Referring to torture, weapons of mass destruction and financial fraud, Prof. Stirling points out that not all innovation is necessarily positive. Any particular innovation is typically ambiguous – open to being viewed in different ways. He therefore argues: “Whether any given innovation is preferable to the alternatives is not just a technical issue, but a fundamentally political question. To pretend that this is simply about ‘science based’ evidence – with no room for different social values – is also undermining of democracy”.

Prof. Stirling’s chapter explores the case for more mature debate and more reasoned decision-making. Across a range of areas, if we are to secure a future for all, there is a need to treat alternative priorities, resource allocations and innovation options in much more balanced and transparent ways, he believes.

For Prof. Stirling, the issues are not just about how fast to go, or even what the risks or benefits might be, in pursuing some supposedly single option, like GM foods. The real questions are about how privileged innovations can quickly get ‘locked in’ and alternatives ‘crowded out’. In the case of sustainable global food production, the chapter details a wide range of alternatives that even UK government support suggests often to be preferable to GM in their potential.

Also today, Prof. Stirling and Professor Paul Nightingale, also of SPRU, gave evidence at the fourth session of the House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee’s inquiry into genetically modified (GM) foods and the way in which these are regulated at European level under the precautionary principle. See resource pack GM food and the precautionary principle.

In both his chapter and his evidence to the committee, Prof. Stirling highlights the importance of more democratic institutions, practices and debates around innovation. Rather than reducing everything simply to ‘risk’, much more attention needs to be given to unquantifiable uncertainties – highlighting the value of more responsible, participatory and precautionary methods for assessing alternative choices.

He also argues for much greater attention to diversity – both in the portfolios of options that can be supported and in the plurality of perspectives to take into account. There exist a range of different practical methods for more effectively addressing these issues, but these also tend to be neglected in simplistic polarizing ‘pro’ / ‘anti’ debates.

The Government Chief Scientific Adviser’s report aims to help improve decision making in regulation and innovation policy. It is hoped the report will promote discussion and a regulatory culture surrounding risk in which robust scientific evidence is openly considered alongside political and other non-scientific issues in shaping policy.

Read the report and Andy Stirling’s chapter

 

More resources

Wednesday, 5 November 2014

Political Ecology: resources, power and justice

With conceptual roots in political economy and cultural ecology, as well as close relationships with development studies and science and technology studies, the multidisciplinary field of political ecology shares a number of theoretical and methodological complementarities with the STEPS Centre’s pathways approach.

In early September 2014, the Lancaster Environment Centre at Lancaster University hosted an exciting workshop that brought together leading political ecologists from throughout the UK and Europe to discuss the state of the field of political ecology and explore promising new directions in field research and in conceptualising environment-society relations in a dynamic world.

The workshop, Political Ecology: Resources, Power, and Justice, featured a full day of doctoral research presentations followed by a second day of research talks by senior scholars in the field.

New questions and directions
The event addressed issues of longstanding significance in political ecology related to resource extraction, conservation, neoliberal natures, and social justice. New and renewed questions and directions emerged as well, for example around development-environment relationships and engagement.

Using research spanning the globe, key themes that emerged over the two-day event included securitisation and militarisation of conservation; the financialisation of nature, including the role of the state in securing control and brokering; ethics; land and resources; the politics of dispossession, belonging, and exclusion; labor and the production of environmental knowledge and value; conflicts, contradictions, and paradoxes in the politics of natural resources; and the role of technology in visualisation and value creation around resources and landscapes.

The PhD sessions engaged a number of topics ranging from the transformation of natural landscapes, livelihoods, and ecological imaginaries through processes of resource expropriation, visualisation, valuation, and marketisation, to conflicts and contradictions between goals of human development and biodiversity conservation, to the discursive space created through the politics of indigeneity.

Conservation and the War on Terror
In her keynote address, 'Environmental governance: from global markets to global security', Professor Rosaleen Duffy (SOAS, University of London) used conservation as an example to make the case that we have entered a new phase of environmental governance characterised by the intersection of neoliberal environmental governance and securitisation/militarisation, specifically linked to the imagery, crisis messages, and technology of the War on Terror.

The keynote was thematically complemented by Dr. Bram Büscher's presentation, which linked the historical intersectionality of race and landscape in South Africa with the contemporary "politics of hysteria" and role of social media in conservation related to the creation of a "space of exception" justifying green militarisation around rhino poaching in Kruger National Park.

Using the case of bioprospecting in Madagascar, conference co-organiser Dr. Ben Neimark discussed the role of scientific labor in producing commodities for green economic development. Neimark particularly highlighted the inequitable and subordinate role of Malagasy scientific labourers in the green economy that they help to produce.

One hallmark of an excellent conference is that attendees come away, not only with answered questions, enhanced knowledge, and clarified concepts, but invigorated by new questions and excitement about the future of the field and its engagements with important contemporary problems that will shape our shared social and environmental futures. In that sense, Political Ecology: Resources, Power, and Justice was thoroughly excellent.

Questions raised
Reflecting on two very busy days, some of the broad questions raised by the event include:
  • How do the themes, issues, methods and orientations represented at link up with and diverge from broader global trends in political ecology?
  • How do we best conceptualise and research environmental struggles and transformations in a world in which environmental governance is increasingly inscribed with market logic, bringing together global discourses around crisis, scarcity, and the market on one hand and place-based narratives of value and crisis on the other in processes of value-laden abstraction?
  • What are the implications possibilities of these processes for lived experience, for social justice, and for environmental futures?
Many thanks to the co-organizers Dr. John Childs and Dr. Ben Neimark, the Lancaster Environment Centre at Lancaster University, and the STEPS Centre.

Tuesday, 10 June 2014

Complexity of politics in Climate Compatible Development: Creating wins over space and time

As the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - Bonn Climate Change Conference takes place in Germany, an IDS-led project funded by the Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) looks at the recent lessons they have learnt on how ‘climate compatible development’ initiatives are unfolding in Ghana, Kenya and Mozambique. Using a political economy approach, the case studies focus on:

  • the contexts in which initiatives occur
  • the potential competition or conflict between different actors and their goals, and 
  • the consequences in terms of who wins and who loses from different aspects of climate compatible development.

The first in a series of three blogs comes from Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Research Fellow Thomas Tanner. Tom is the lead researcher of the Ghana case study that considers the political economy of climate compatible development in the coastal fisheries sector.


I still remember the moment I realised that I ‘got’ what geography was all about -  mapping two axes of time and space, with points on the graph marked as events occurring at particular places. So simple, but effectively summing up what a geographers eye brings to an analysis.

Climate compatible development
And such simplicity underlies the appeal of the three interlocking circles that characterise the 'Climate Compatible Development' approach championed by the Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN). It was originally devised to communicate the inter-relationship between climate change and development to the Department of International Development (DFID) senior managers and Ministers – rather effectively it seems as climate change is one of DFID’s 6 strategic Structural Reform Priorities.

Climate Compatible Development
Source: Mitchell and Maxwell, 2010
  • The diagram is useful because it helps us consider development processes and pathways in terms of whether they will contribute to these distinct but related objectives:
  • Improving access to cleaner energy can help prevent climate change at the same time as providing people and businesses with the light, heat and electricity they need
  • Diversified livelihoods or flood-proof infrastructure can improve incomes and services at the same time as being more resilient in the face of climate change impacts.
  • And in the sweet spot at the centre, the holy grail of the ‘triple win’ – such as growing climate-resilient cassava for ethanol production as fuel for cook-stoves, or planting trees alongside crops such as coffee or cocoa to provide shade, stabilise soils and store soil carbon and biomass.  


Political economy of climate change
But while the diagram points us towards enhancing synergies, it hides some of the challenges of hitting ‘the sweet spot’ at the centre that are linked to the political economy of climate change. There will usually be trade-offs between the three different strategies, with potentially different winners and losers from different policy mixes:

  • Should the designs of new cook stoves aim to maximise fuel efficiency or maximise usability?
  • Should adaptation to coastal erosion prioritise protecting infrastructure or local livelihood activities? 
  • Would removal of fossil fuel subsidies prevent people moving out of poverty? 

Such tradeoffs highlight the politics underpinning climate compatible development policy making the development. I’ve been involved in these issues through a project examining the political economy of climate compatible development in Ghana, Kenya and Mozambique. This is an interesting understanding of the realities of how the space for climate compatible development has been and might be further expanded – we can see this as how the three interlocking circles can be brought closer together to enlarge the space for synergies (see figure below).

 In reality, this actually means understanding the forces keeping these circles apart, such as

  • Simple low awareness
  • The short-term nature of investment decision making, 
  • The benefits of oil and gas exploitation for revenue and energy security that might be incompatible with mitigation objectives. 

But the work has also got us thinking about space and time in more depth (and woken the sleeping geographer that lives in each of us). Prof Chris Gordon, Director of the University of Ghana’s Institute for Environment and Sanitation Studies (IESS), challenged us to think of the three circles as dynamic across time and space as presented in the figure below from IESS Ghana. As such, we should also try to understand how the drivers of these different strategies lead them to be more or less prominent, and more or less interconnected, over time. And thinking spatially, how do international factors such as climate funds, international policy under the UNFCCC, or the release of the new IPCC Assessment Reports affect the national and local drivers of change?


Dynamic Triple Wins across space and time Source: Chris Gordon, IESS Ghana

In Ghana for example, while the mitigation agenda was strongly endorsed by senior politicians following the Copenhagen Summit of 2009, national adaptation needs are now being given much greater attention as a response to impacts on people’s livelihoods from factors like coastal erosion, changing rainfall patterns and heat-waves. Similarly, reductions in the subsidies for premix fuel used by small-scale fishermen might have a detrimental effect on development in the short term by making fishing less viable as a livelihood, but contribute to mitigation and help prevent collapse of fish stocks from overfishing over longer timescales. As payment systems for avoiding deforestation become more advanced, perhaps the drivers of mangrove preservation will swing towards their mitigation benefits?

So the geographer in me continues to ask: Is it time to make space for spacetime thinking in climate compatible development?

Thursday, 1 May 2014

Peasants & Politics: new free articles from the Journal of Peasant Studies

JPS coverA new Journal of Peasant Studies special issue focusing on Peasants & Politics is out now, part of the JPS's series celebrating its 40th anniversary.

This new collection highlights some of the key articles that have been published in the journal over the past four decades on peasant politics. The articles are free to access from the JPS website until 31 December 2014.

From the website:
"The articles share one common feature: they all remain extremely relevant, especially in the context of today's massive, worldwide revival of critical agrarian studies. We hope academics will find the virtual special issue useful in their courses. We hope students of contemporary critical agrarian studies and critical environmental studies, among others, will find it useful in building their theoretical foundations. We hope policy practitioners will find it relevant in informing policy debates. We hope agrarian, food and environmental activists will find it relevant in their political struggles."

JPS: Peasants and Politics Virtual Special Issue
 

Thursday, 3 April 2014

After 10 years, does CAADP understand political economy?


voter in Juba
Image: Registered voter by enoughproject on Flickr
(cc-by-nc-nd-2.0)
The Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) has clocked up 10 years since its endorsement by the Heads of State and Government in 2003 in Maputo, Mozambique. The underlying objective of CAADP is to reconfigure how agricultural issues are formulated, policies are generated and debated, investment decisions are implemented, and interventions scrutinized. To achieve the desired transformation of the agricultural, governments committed themselves to allocate at least 10% of their annual budgets to the agricultural sector – which would, in turn, enable them to attain at least 6% agricultural growth per annum so as to catalyze poverty reduction on a sustainable basis.

The 10th CAADP Partnership Platform (PP) meeting in Durban, South Africa from 18th to 22nd March 2014 was a critical one. It provided the opportunity to review CAADP progress and plan for the next decade. The 10th CAADP PP was themed ’Transforming Africa’s agriculture for shared prosperity: Harnessing opportunities for inclusive growth and sustainable development’. This theme was in total sync with CAADP’s overarching goal, which is to facilitate the continent’s agricultural transformation and sustained inclusive agricultural growth for shared prosperity and improved livelihoods.

The event’s overriding goal was to contribute to efforts to sustain CAADP’s momentum in the next decade or so through mutual learning and experience-sharing among countries. The idea was to strengthen and deepen country engagements and ownership in a bid to advance the agriculture and food security agenda. In fact, Heads of State and Government have declared 2014 the Year of Agriculture and Food Security in Africa. This was seized by the 10th CAADP PP as a springboard to work towards sustaining CAADP implementation momentum.

Ambitious goals

According to the 10th CAADP PP concept note (pdf), the event was systematically structured into nine work streams in order to provide strategic guidance to the deliberations, reviews and reflections. Prior to the 10th CAADP PP, the work streams undertook extensive consultations which guided the deliberations in parallel sessions at the event. Plenary sessions were held to share the main objective of the 10th CAADP and to build consensus on the goals agreed in the parallel sessions.

The work streams included the following: 1) agriculture science, education and skills development agenda; 2) agriculture inputs; 3) land and land policy; 4) rural infrastructure, market access, regional trade and integration; 5) food and nutrition security; 6) public-private sector engagement and investment financing; 7) agriculture and climate change in relation to economic growth, resilience and agricultural risk management; 8) data, M&E and mutual accountability; and 9) policies and institutions. Each of the work streams identified an overarching goal(s) which were endorsed in the plenary session in the order specified above as follows:
  • Double the current level of agricultural total factor productivity by 2025 through the application of science for agriculture.
  • Increase production and productivity by improving profitability and accessibility of agricultural inputs.
  • Increase investments by 20 percent in agricultural land which contributes to sustainable social and economic development.
  • Double trade in agriculture products within Africa by 2025.
  • All households and individuals in Africa must be food and nutrition secure by 2025.
  • Accelerate and deepen inclusive value chains and public-private partnership.
  • Ensure that resilience mechanisms are in place and function at national, regional and continental level.
  • Establish open and accessible data systems at country level.
  • Recommit to enacting and enforcing consistent and predictable macro-economic policies and micro-economic regulations that affirm regional obligations, enhance the effectiveness of public investments in agriculture and catalyze increased private sector, especially in value chains.
These goals are expected to feed into the development of a robust result framework with indicators that will help to systematically track CAADP’s progress over the next decade, buoyed by Africa’s apparent bright economic prospects. Five result areas have been identified, against which CAADP’s progress will be systematically tracked. Three of the five result areas are: 1) improved and inclusive policy design and implementation capacity for agriculture; 2) more effective and accountable institutions to drive planning and implementation of public and investment policies; and 3) more inclusive and evidence based policy making in agriculture.

 

Does CAADP understand what is stopping progress?

The critical question is whether the deliberations, reviews and reflections at the 10th CAADP PP, following the designation of the year 2014 as the Year of Agriculture and Food Security in Africa, offer any hope for the continent’s agriculture and food security agenda? While the 10th CAADP PP’s agenda was predominantly prospective, it was nonetheless quite striking how very little time was devoted to understanding the impediments to CAADP’s implementation. For instance, only seven countries have consistently surpassed the CAADP 10 percent target. The number rises to 11 for all countries that have either met or surpassed the 10 percent target since the endorsement of the CAADP declaration in 2003.

Furthermore, there was literally no reflection about the quality of the investments for those countries that have met and even surpassed the 10 percent budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector. The Malawi case immediately comes to mind. It has surpassed the 10 percent target since the 2005/06 growing season but as much as 75 percent of the budget to the agricultural sector is devoted to the provision of subsidies, at the expense of research and extension – which have equally significant transformative potential for the agricultural sector.

The debates in the plenary session on the goals agreed upon in the nine work streams were illustrative of the challenges that lie ahead for the CAADP agenda. Overall, the main concern was that the agenda set for sustaining the CAADP implementation momentum was not comprehensive enough to ensure that it really drives the continent’s transformation agenda with agriculture as a leading sector. Four issues came up quite strongly in the course of the debates on the work stream goals in the concluding plenary session.

First, the delegates felt that the question of youth as future farmers was not adequately addressed. This was a concern in the context of the apparent ageing farming population on the continent and the apparent youth’s lack of interest in farming.

Second, the delegates observed that the goals were not engendered. It was argued that the failure to engender the goals would undermine the achievement of the agriculture and food security agenda especially since women play a critical role in Africa’s agriculture particularly in the production of food crops.

The third observation related to mechanization of agriculture on the continent as a strategy to attract the youth to the sector and ease the burden on women, but it was not mentioned in any of the nine work stream goals. Delegates making this observation argued that the transformation of the continent’s agricultural sector cannot be achieved without widespread mechanization on the continent.

Finally, some delegates queried the absence of a goal specifically addressing the question of knowledge management for sustainable transformation. They argued that without a knowledge base distilling lessons and challenges that have slowed down progress hitherto efforts to renew commitment to CAADP implementation would encounter similar impediments and obstacles.

Missing political economy?

The final concern clearly pointed to weaknesses of the 10th CAADP PP in bringing out and reflecting on the political economy challenges that have impeded CAADP’s implementation in its first decade. This is further reflected in the goals from each work stream. Even the work stream goal on policies and institutions is couched almost entirely in technocratic and economistic terms. The goals as outlined above clearly show that there is a preoccupation with delivering results, which is not matched by a thorough understanding of what it would take to achieve those results on a sustainable basis.

The voices of the parliamentarians who participated in the 10th CAADP PP were loud and clear. They clearly heightened the deficiencies of the CAADP implementation framework from a political economy perspective. All the MPs who spoke pointed out that CAADP is not known by the general population across the continent apart from technocrats, and primarily those who reside in the Ministries of Agriculture.

They attributed the apparent lack of awareness of CAADP among the general population to the failure of the appropriate officials and agencies to engage across the continent. Even parliamentarians who belong to the Pan African Parliament were not fully aware of CAADP. It is therefore not surprising that very few countries have achieved the 10 percent target. The parliamentarians argued that this would have been easier if parliamentarians, who deal with national budgets, were fully aware of the CAADP agenda.

By Blessings Chinsinga

Tuesday, 18 March 2014

Engendering CAADP: What must be done in the next 10 years?

by Ruth Hall

A wide-ranging debate about the past 10 years of CAADP acknowledged that the process has been largely gender-blind. There was broad agreement that, in the next 10 years, CAADP must make visible women’s investment in agriculture and address the challenges of the future by reorienting agricultural investment towards women and towards sustainable agriculture.

There is widespread consensus that African countries still invest too little in agriculture. Only 7 of 49 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have consistently reached the Maputo Declaration budget target of 10% investment in agriculture.

Smallholders dominate in agriculture, but not in visions for the future of agriculture. 90% of agricultural production comes from small farms and smallholder farms contribute 40-60% of rural incomes, as people combine farming with non-farm activities. While it varies across countries, women contribute between 50% and 80% of the agricultural workforce.

Rudo Makunike of NEPAD presented on the progress and lessons learnt from 10 years into the CAADP process, there are now 40 country compacts and 28 national investment plans. ECOWAS and COMESA both have regional CAADP compacts. Achievements include greater political commitment to agriculture, higher budget allocations, mobilised stakeholders around a common agenda, and promoted regional integration and coordination. CAADP has promoted not only production but also value addition.

Fatou Mbaye from ACORD and Ruchi Tripathi from ActionAid presented analysis from a joint report by their organisations, entitled ‘From rhetoric to action’ and ‘walking the talk’. Their research shows that, across much of the continent, agricultural research is mostly top-down and supply-driven. African governments need to increase investments in sustainable agriculture, by spending more on research and extension services and reorient them to address women farmers’ priorities. This requires involving women in defining research priorities.

Among the recommendations from ACORD and ActionAid were to improve the quantity and quality of public investment, increase the role of farmers’ cooperatives, re-orient spending priorities to focus on women farmers, step up investments in sustainable agriculture that reduces input-dependency, and ensure land tenure for women smallholder farmers.

CAADP is a useful framework because it recognises agriculture as it is helping to reverse the marginalisation of agriculture in the development agenda. As Ruchi Tripathi argued, CAADP has been positive: it pushes coordination among ministries and focuses donors’ efforts; and National Investment Plans have led to increased investment, but CAADP has not yet delivered to women smallholders. National Investment Plans and CAADP compacts are all consistent with the CAADP framework, but none of these prioritise smallholders and smallholder women in particular.

The biggest private investors in African agriculture are women smallholders, so both public and private investment should be in them. The litmus test for all CAADP planning should be this: what would a women smallholder like in terms of agricultural spending?

A concrete suggestion put forward in the discussion was that rural women smallholders’ associations should be supported to meet before CAADP meetings to organise themselves as a caucus to influence multi-stakeholder engagements.

Shingaidzo Mupindo from FAO argued that, if women had the same resources as men, they could increase production from their farms by 20-30%. Even if you connect smallholders to markets, when it comes to who controls the money, husbands will say to a wife ‘did you bring land here?’, suggesting that male claims to the land remains the basis for control over incomes, despite women’s labour contributions.

FAO’s approach is to partner with governments and others to promote the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, to provide technical capacity, to link land access and tenure security to investment and production growth. Yet she recognized that these processes have not yet touched ordinary women smallholders.

Some criticisms of CAADP are that there is a multiplicity of initiatives and a risk of bureaucratization – too much talk, and little action. There is a compelling need for attention to livelihood needs. In the coming 10 years CAADP will be on using public investments to leverage private investments, and promoting ‘wealth creation’. There was some skepticism about this, and how it would be defined, who would acquire this wealth and the degree to which it would ensure benefits accruing to women.

Several clear themes emerged from the discussion.

Agreement about gender blindness of CAADP
In discussion, there was general agreement that the CAADP process has been gender blind, but disagreement about whether there is real change underway towards redressing this. CAADP is collaborating with the NEPAD Gender Unit, to see how CAADP can respond to gender issues, and is to launch a ‘gender fund’, but this was criticized as relegating women to a ‘special interest’ category, rather than redirecting agricultural budgets more generally. NEPAD confirmed that there would be opportunities to participate in the gender review process.

Agreement about limited implementation of CAADP
There is also a generalised non-implementation of CAADP because there remain major funding gaps in the NAIPs, which governments hope to fill from private investors and donors. There’s also a big difference between the budget and actual spend. So the challenge is to increase capacity to implement plans, as well as to reorientate the plans themselves.

How to promote sustainable agriculture and agroecological farming?
Promotion of input-intensive production methods biases agricultural programmes against women smallholders. There is hostility towards sustainable and agroecological farming among decision-makers, and CAADP is not helping to reverse this. Women carry an unfair burden of food security, which itself is severely compromised. The IAASTD (International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology for Development) report said its key message is this: small-scale farmers and agroecological production methods are the way forward to solve the food crisis.

How to hold states accountable for investment?
The private sector only invests where there are prospects, and the state has to invest to create conditions that shape investor behavior in ways that benefit women, and don’t displace them. There was some debate about agricultural growth corridors like SAGCOT (Southern Agriculture Corridor) in Tanzania and ProSavana in Mozambique and whether these are excluding women smallholders.

How to influence CAADP?
NEPAD’s role is to coordinate it, but CAADP is driven and determined primarily at country level, and it is up to governments to popularise it. NEPAD acknowledged that it may not be known by farmers, if it is to be responsive, then farmers – especially women farmers – should be at the centre of planning and determining priorities. ActionAid’s suggestion of women smallholder caucuses being organised ahead of CAADP meetings was the most concrete suggestion to address this.

Wednesday, 12 February 2014

STEPS-JNU SYMPOSIUM: Nexus narratives – water politics in Asia

7By Ian Scoones, Co-Director, STEPS Centre
 
The fourth panel at the STEPS-JNU Symposium focused on the highly contested narratives around how water is stored and accessed in Asia, with cases from Nepal, Laos, and Thailand. As Uttam Sinha from The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, commented, Asia is facing a “hydrological moment” that is redefining the politics of water and the relations between nation states in the region. New connections between epistemic and policy communities with a regional basis are being forged that suggest a fundamental rethinking of transboundary and riparian policy and politics.

It is in this context that the STEPS project team has set about interrogating and unpacking the increasingly popular idea of the resource ‘nexus’. The intersection of food, water and energy has been popularised in policy discourse, as a focus for intervention in recent years. In the region and internationally the nexus discourse has been building over time to reach fever pitch. As Jeremy Allouche from the STEPS Centre observed, this is accompanied by metaphors such as the ‘perfect storm’, as well as operational frames such as the ‘green economy’. This is very much associated with international donor-led efforts and increasingly framing research. As Carl Middleton from Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, pondered, is the nexus idea in fact just a rediscovery of what communities already knew? Why is it only now that such integrative ideas are becoming central to a mainstream narrative? Is this the moment that experts emerge from their silos, as they realise that sustainability questions are highly complex?

However, how ideas around the food-water-energy nexus play out is highly dependent on the national and regional political context and is deeply influenced by framing and interest politics, as the case studies showed. In the Laos Mekong case, a detailed analysis of policy documents across different institutions showed how framings of scarcity, security and nexus intersections differ. Carl showed how the Asian Development Bank highlighted economic and physical scarcity and therefore prioritised infrastructure interventions, particularly by the private sector. This contrasted with the International Water Management Institute that highlighted local production practices, and solutions were connected global and local projects, while conservation organisations such as IUCN focused on natural resource scarcity and the need for protection measures. While adopting the nexus discourse, very different perspectives on what is scarce, what needs to be secured, and what to do about it are shown.

The session asked is ‘the nexus’ a useful concept? Currently, as the cases showed vividly, the framing is very top down, often linked to external interests, and outsider-generated managerial solutions. In addition, in identifying a particular crisis at the nexus, a space for appropriation is opened up, often linked to a partial enclosure of previously shared, regional commons (a form of ‘green grabbing’). Investment imperatives linked to notions of food, energy, or water ‘security’ drive such appropriations by the private sector, supported by national political interests. As Jayanta Bandyopadhyay, formerly Indian Institute of Management Calcutta (IIMC), Kolkata, pointed out such a politics of knowledge has dominated by investment intervention and engineering design results in formerly public goods being captured and sold, resulting in an adaptation of a popular saying: “Rivers should flow uninterrupted, but only through my tunnels”.

As Dipak Gyawali, Nepal Academy of Science and Technology, former Minister of Water Resources, Nepal, pointed out this has resulted in a contested regional politics between ‘landlord’ countries and the ‘battery’ countries that supply the water. As he observed: “Age old questions are coming back to haunt us. Issues of security are being recast”. Whose security are we talking about? What is the most effective locus for resource governance? How do can multiple uses and users be accommodated? What institutions can respond? Is a river a source of energy for hydropower, food through fisheries or water for domestic use and agricultural irrigation? And who is responsible and accountable?

The challenge, as Dipak pointed out, is that each of the potential multiple institutions involved come with their own framings, different definitions of the problem, and particular histories and proclivities. There is, it was argued, a need for space for different providers to provide diverse options, and for negotiation between them across different groups. “The imagination of plural pathways can only become a reality if a diversity of users and their practices are involved”, as Lawrence Surendra, University of Mysore, observed. “Plural pathways and clumsy solutions” are needed, the panel contributors argued. Only a diversity of responses – “many ten percent solutions” – can, Dipak argued, can create pathways to sustainability more effectively and securely

Tuesday, 28 January 2014

Missing politics and food sovereignty

via campesina mural
Por uma vida sem catracas – MPL e Via
Campesina juntos
via desvio on Flickr
By Ian Scoones

Over the last two decades La Via Campesina has grown as a movement campaigning for a change in the global agri-food system. Some claim that it is the world's largest social movement. Its main rallying cry has been a demand for 'food sovereignty', a term, as Marc Edelman notes, that has a longer genealogy but has become very effectively popularised by La Via Campesina in recent years. This is an argument for peasant autonomy, local food systems, fairer more environmentally-sound, agroecological production and trade and much more besides. As a vision and political programme it is one to which many would subscribe.

A major event was held last week at the Institute for Social Studies in the Hague, co-hosted by the Land Deal Politics Initiative. It brought together around 350 academics and activists concerned with food and agriculture in both the global North and South in a critical dialogue about food sovereignty. It followed on from a similar event at Yale University last year that was equally well attended. Over 80 papers have been produced, some of which have already appeared in the Journal of Peasant Studies.

I was intrigued to find out where the food sovereignty debate had got to, what political strategies were emerging and whether, in different and diverse contexts, the ideals were in fact realisable. The ISS event opened with an impressive keynote panel that I chaired. Elizabeth Mpofu, the General Coordinator of La Via Campesina from Zimbabwe opened the proceedings, and this was followed by a panel including Susan George, the famous author and activist and Chair of the Transnational Institute, another of the hosts; Olivier De Schutter, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food; Teodor Shanin, President of the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences a leading scholar on peasant issues; and Tania Li, professor at Toronto University and who has done excellent work on agrarian change in southeast Asia. An impressive array of expertise and experience indeed. The subsequent sessions were no less impressive and the discussion was vibrant and challenging. This is a debate that raises passions and differences.

What were my reflections on the day? In many ways I was left rather confused as to what food sovereignty was, and how it was to be translated into a political struggle. As Peter Rosset from ECOSUR in Chiapas explained, the concept has evolved, and the movement has adopted many different angles as more and more elements have been incorporated. These included the move from a focus on small-scale production and markets to concerns with gender, indigenous peoples, environment, workers, consumers, migrants, trade relations and more. All are unquestionably important themes, and each was debated intensively during the conference.

Through accreting issues and agendas, the movement thus offers an all-encompassing vision where nothing is left out it seems. This helps build linkages between different areas of activism, but it also makes it very difficult to get a handle on what the core issues are, and where to focus intellectual and political energies. This is made more challenging by the lack of clarity over the focus of the key concept – sovereignty. There is much focus on 'the local', but this may not be sovereign without addressing the role of the state, or indeed the relationships between states in international trade and global politics. A populist appeal to locality may miss the importance of defining the arenas for political action that necessarily impinge on what happens in local settings.

In my comments, I observed the slightly odd paradox that a clearly intensely political issue, part of an assertive political project, often lacked a solid political analysis, and indeed that a more thorough-going engagement with critical agrarian studies might help address this gap.

Three areas of politics, I felt, were missing.

The first was the politics of peasants. La Via Campesina – the peasant's way – asserts the rights of peasants. But who is the peasantry in the context of a globalising world, with dynamic patterns of differentiation across sites? Classic issues of class formation and differentiation are raised, ones that Henry Bernstein so effectively elaborated in his 'sceptical view' paper for the Yale conference. What is the relationship between the peasantry and workers, or indeed worker-peasants, with one foot in town and another in the countryside? Are petty commodity producers or even emergent commercial farmers part of the peasantry, or separate? What differences of gender, age, race for example cut across these class differences, and what conflicts and tensions arise? These are old questions, but highly pertinent to the formation of the emergent solidarities that must define a movement. Creating an idealised vision of a peasant, seemingly independent of context, makes the political project problematic, as the contradictions and conflicts that arise between and within groups may act to undermine the alliances required for a movement to gain traction.

The second area of missing politics was around the politics of technology and ecology. An important strand of the food sovereignty movement is the advocacy for an agroecological approach to farming. Low external inputs, organic production, rejection of biotechnology and so on are all hallmarks. Yet in the advocacy of agroecology too often there is a resort to an essentialist, technical argument, thus falling into the same trap as the advocates of the technologies that are opposed. As Jack Kloppenberg has put it in respect of agricultural biotechnology, the argument should be less about the particular technology but instead around the terms of access. An open access approach to research and development may generate a range of productivity-enhancing technologies that improve efficiency and reduce production costs, without being at the behest of large-scale corporations. New technologies are of course essential for improving agriculture. Improving the yield of crops through high-tech genetics or the use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides may be essential, yet seem to be rejected by agroecology fundamentalisms.

The bottom line is that farmers want good prices, and consumers want cheap food. This structural relation between producers and consumers was discussed many times at the event, while noting that the current agri-food system involves much distortion of prices, and a distribution of value in corporate-controlled value chains that often benefits agribusinesses and retailers, and neither producers nor consumers. Yet too often local food systems can only produce expensive food for elite markets – to the bourgeoisie of Paris' Left Bank shopping in the flourishing bio-organic weekend markets, as noted by one commentator. Clearly internalising the costs to the environment and to labour of the current agri-food system is essential, and this will doubtless produce shorter commodity chains, more localised production and marketing, better conditions for workers and a more equitable distribution of value, as well as more ecologically-sensitive forms of production. Yet, even with such measures, a diversity of innovative, technological responses will be necessary that should not be limited by a technically narrow definition of agroecology.

The third area was the politics of capital, and in particular the relationships between capital and the peasantry. Again, a very old debate. Peasants, however they are defined, are never disengaged from the historical processes of capitalist development. Indeed they are mutually constituted by such processes. The debate is not therefore how to disengage, but how to negotiate the terms of incorporation. There were many examples of adverse incorporation discussed at the conference, where poor, marginalised farmers were disadvantaged. But the solution, as Tania Li showed with her case from Indonesia, is not to go back to earlier forms of production and market relationship, but to organise for a better deal – in her case for small scale cocoa production, produced as a mono-crop in a remote area where few other livelihood opportunities existed. Re-embedding markets in social contexts, following Karl Polanyi, is essential if a more democratic control of the food system is to be realised, and this means a political struggle around the terms of trade, the rejection of monopolistic market behaviours, and the opening up of markets to a wider range of players. In many ways, this is an advocacy for a better functioning capitalism without the distortions of corporate concentration, not its rejection outright. This means developing a more strategic engagement with capital around the terms of incorporation and the relationships between markets and societal values, much as the fair trade, organic certification and other movements have done.

The progressive ambitions and utopian ideals of food sovereignty are clearly evident, and ones that many can easily subscribe to. But how to translate this into a political programme and strategic advocacy around which clear solidarities and alliances can build is less evident. Perhaps with a tighter political economic analysis of the nature of the problem, always necessarily contextualised by history and place, then a more targeted, more effective approach might emerge. I left the conference unsure. I was inspired by the passion and vision of the movement participants and their academic allies, but I was perhaps more sceptical at the end than when I arrived about the practicalities of how, in any setting that I know of, such a vision might be realised in practice. This is of course not a reason to reject trying, but it also suggests the need to think harder about both political possibilities and strategies.

Monday, 16 September 2013

Has a 'policy space' for pastoralism been opened up in Kenya?

ASAL-s
Kenya’s arid and semi-arid lands (known as ‘ASALs’, highlighted on the map - click for large version) have never enjoyed the kind of policy attention that takes account of their unique capacities and challenges. Pastoralism, the dominant production system in much of the region, has been especially misunderstood. Pastoralists and livestock move around; there is low population density but high population growth. Customary practices and indigenous knowledge play a strong role. National policy and practice has rarely taken account of these factors. The area is chronically marginalised and isolated, and literacy and vaccination rates are low.

The Ministry of State for Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands was set up to address these challenges. A new working paper by Izzy Birch and Mohamed Elmi, Creating Policy Space for Pastoralism in Kenya (pdf), tells the story of how and why the Ministry was created, and some of the lessons learned.

You can watch the authors explaining the story in this seminar at the Institute of Development Studies in May 2013:



Formed in April 2008, the Ministry picked up on a growing recognition that the region’s economic potential had been overlooked. Its creation could be seen as opening a ‘policy space’, where new opportunities, relationships and directions are possible.

Pastoralism in Kenya has long faced policy and institutional challenges. A historical neglect of development in the ASALs, and repeated cycles of drought and conflict, reinforced the idea that pastoralism was unviable. But the region’s problems were as much a product, if not more, of political choices than of ecology. This framing began to be challenged by emerging narratives during the 2000s, including economic potential, diversity and equality, and resilience.

Priorities
In this context, the Ministry had to choose its priorities carefully. From the early days the Ministry saw itself as time-bound, with a long list of expectations and demands. It concentrating its efforts on measures to re-balance policy and institutional priorities in the long-term interests of the region. In part because of a limited budget and timeframe, the Ministry decided to focus on strategic and systemic change: co-ordination, implementing selected programmes, looking to reform policy and institutions, and regional interaction across national borders.

The working paper also discusses the Ministry’s relationships with NGOs, development partners, parliament, the research community, the private sector and individuals. In the area of policy reform, the Ministry looked for strong evidence to back up its claims, and offered an alternative storyline – of opportunity and potential – to counter the dominant negative view of the region.

Progress
Progress in co-ordination efforts was variable. Some strides forward were made in the energy, education and health sectors, but road provision and security were less successful. In terms of the policy process, the Ministry broadened the focus of ASAL policy from food security to take in a wider range of sectors, putting the social, cultural, legal and institutional impediments to development on the table.

The ASAL Policy, approved by Parliament in December 2012, represented the end of a decade-long struggle. It was important for its symbolism as well as its content. Among other things, the policy established an institutional framework to oversee its interpretation and implementation, which provided dedicated and specialist attention to ASAL issues within government.

What next?
What future for pastoral development in Kenya? It is still early days, and the progress made so far needs follow up and support. Policy spaces close as well as open. Ahead lies a period of institutional change and uncertainty. As the ASALs are brought further into the heart of government they will become implicated in different power struggles. But some shifts have taken place. The challenge now will be to sustain the process of policy reform and continue to learn from this experience.

Further resources

Monday, 5 August 2013

Zimbabwe’s elections 2013: more confusion, more uncertainty

Zimbabwe's trauma continues. The Zimbabwe Election Commission has announced a landslide victory for ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF reportedly took two-thirds of the parliamentary seats and President Mugabe won 61 per cent of the presidential vote, with Morgan Tsvangirai picking up 34 per cent. MDC-T has called the elections 'a sham', 'a farce', 'null and void'. GNU education minister, David Coltart, argued that “Zimbabwe has been subjected to electoral fraud on a massive scale”. Tendai Biti called it all a 'loquacious tragedy'.

Meanwhile, the official observers from SADC and the AU have called the election 'peaceful, credible and efficient', 'free and peaceful', reflecting 'the will of the people', with high turnouts and orderly voting. Some have called for a rejection of the ballot and the staging of mass resistance. Baba Jukwa, the massively popular Facebook avatar with 350k 'likes' who claims he is a disaffected ZANU-PF insider, has declared war.

We will never know the 'true' results, although as last time there was probably a rural-urban and regional split, with more of a balance overall than any political grouping claims. Both main parties naturally proclaimed before the poll that they were likely to be certain victors. Results of prior opinion polling were mixed, although pointing towards a rehabilitation of ZANU-PF and disillusionment with the MDC's performance in government. Meanwhile, the MDC and the allied NGO groups long before the elections pointed to the potential for electoral fraud, and the cynical manipulation of the vote.  While unlike 2008 there was thankfully minimal violence during the election period, the Zimbabwe Election Support Network argued that there were major problems with the process, including:
  •  Voters'  roll discrepancies
  • Intimidation
  • Late  opening of polling stations
  • Slow pace of assisting aspiring voters in some urban polling stations
  • High number of assisted voters recorded in rural areas
  • Shortage of ballot papers in some wards
  • First time voters denied the chance to vote as they were not appearing in the      voters' roll and their registration slips had missing ward details.
A joint statement from the NGOs rejected the election results. The AU observer team also expressed 'grave concerns'. The UK and the US have also called the elections 'flawed'. China, India, South Africa and others have remained silent so far, although this is how it was reported in the China Daily and The Hindu.

The scale and implications of the problems remain unclear. Claims and counter claims are being made. In a small country, rigging the vote by over a million is a hell of lot, especially consistently across presidential, parliamentary and council elections. The turnout was high at around 3.5m, making it even more challenging. Maybe they did win as many had expected, but perhaps not by as big a margin as declared.

However, suspicions of foul play are running high. ZANU-PF is a sophisticated and ruthless operation. Such suspicions are increased by bizarre rumours about dodgy security companies, Israeli pens in the voting booths where the ink disappears, special ballot papers with watermarks with crosses against ZANU-PF already inserted and a specially imported Chinese solution for removing the pink ink from voters' fingers. No-one really knows what happened; and we probably never will.

The final tallies are being published (check here and here for details), but the scale of the ZANU-PF win is clear. What is for sure is that the disputes over the results will run and run, with legal challenges to follow. If the confusion and uncertainty persists, the tentative recovery that had been nurtured since 2009 may be quickly wiped out if a new government does not move quickly to assure investors, donors and others.

What to make of it all? I am unsure, but here are a few quick reflections and some links to some interesting sources and commentaries that I have found over the last few days.
The rehabilitation of the image of ZANU-PF and President Mugabe in particular has been striking. For example on a flight from Addis to London, a colleague of mine was handed a copy of the New African, with a special glossy insert feature on Zimbabwe. It had articles from all the leading presidential candidates, but in the small print you could see that it was produced by the Ministry of Information. The message was clear: Zimbabwe was back on track, and Mugabe was in charge.

The MDC formations meanwhile were floundering. While having some successes in government – notably on the economy (under Tendai Biti) and in education (under David Coltart) – in many people's eyes they had been tainted by power, lacking ideas and vision, and reverting to the corrupt practices that they had criticised in opposition.

The election manifestos of the main parties (ZANU-PF, MDC-T, MDC and ZAPU) were predictable enough, but none really fired people's interest. The issue of land was of course ever-present in the electioneering discourse, deployed in particular by ZANU-PF to bolster its nationalist and rural credentials. The MDC groupings, even after over a decade, sadly still failed to offer a convincing alternative narrative on land and rural development.

Of course the elections were not being fought on such policy issues. Those opposed to ZANU-PF however failed to broker a coalition of opposition, and the vote was often divided, particularly in Matabeleland, but also in some urban centres, including Masvingo. David Coltart of MDC-N for example lost his seat to a MDC-T candidate. Political and personal differences, combined with narrow regionalism and factionalism, provided a perfect opportunity for ZANU-PF, despite it also being divided and weak.

This was Zimbabwe's first electronic, Internet age election. There was hope that these mechanisms – checking voter registration, crowd mapping election violations, posting votes, monitoring election sites and mapping results – would bring greater transparency and accountability. There was an impressive array of engagement, from the 7000 'citizen monitors' deployed by the ZESN to the websites of  Sokwanele, MyVote and Simukai. Twitter and Facebook pages have gone wild, with intensive commentary and debate not least via the Baba Jukwa pages.

But, in the end, it didn't seem to have an impact on the legitimacy and credibility of the process. Too many questions remained unanswered, and confusion still prevails, as the various 'independent' observers and monitored contradicted each other, declaring either the elections broadly free and fair or discredited by foul play.

The international media has as a result of all this also been deeply confused. No-one is quite sure what to make of it all. As Andrew Harding of the BBC commented, there is now a battle over the narrative of the election, not the specific results. Some of the media had decided what the narrative was before it was held, but there has been some thoughtful commentary too. Lydia Polgreen of the NYT was typically nuanced, bringing in the land dimension into one of her pieces. The FT had a good article on the key role of the military. David Smith of the Guardian had a few good pieces too. Also, African Arguments posted several good commentaries in the build up, including by Brian Raftopolous and Simukai Tinhu. And then there were the bloggers and the twitter sphere, with #zimelection carrying all sorts of commentary and links; some sensible and sound, some weird and whacky.

The political uncertainty that these elections have delivered means that, sadly once again, the immediate future is in the balance. Whoever individual Zimbabweans voted for, the final overall outcome may not be what anyone wanted – which was peace and stability. As a friend commented on the phone from Gwanda just now: "It's trouble again".  Let's hope that a spirit of accommodation and compromise prevails.

In the next period at least, ZANU-PF can organise the succession from Mugabe from a position of strength, and the opposition will have to regroup again, probably under new leadership. The political landscape has certainly changed with this election, but the full implications still remain unclear. 

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland

Monday, 24 June 2013

Exposing the political journey of climate change evidence from Exeter to Africa

The Met Office's modelling IBM supercomputer
Stephen Whitfield, PhD student, Institute of Development Studies (Knowledge, Technology and Society Team) 

For someone more used to the quiet productivity and relative inconspicuousness of the PhD office at the Institute of Development Studies, the headquarters of the UK Meteorological Office in Exeter is impressive and intimidating in equal measure. Mazes of desk separators fill vast open plan offices and obscure a sea of computer screens displaying intriguing and animated maps. It feels very much like the climate modelling hub that it is, as much an industrial factory of climate forecasts as it is a place of intellectual exchange and research. You immediately get a sense of the complexity and scale of the whole operation behind producing climate model projections.

My visit to the Met Office back in January 2012 was the beginning of an exciting year in which I had the opportunity to follow these climate model projections all the way to Kenya, to their use in projects that made predictions of the country's future yields of maize and ultimately in the design of climate change adaptation interventions for smallholder maize farmers.

It was a fascinating process, not just because of the mystery of the sophisticated computer programmes through which vast data sets gradually became simple pictures of the future world, but also because of the way that understandings and meanings became attached to these pictures.

Undoubtedly what went missing along the journey were the uncertainties, assumptions, and methodological choices that were such a big part of the initial modelling endeavour. By the time it came to promoting technologies designed to help farmers adapt to the growing threat of water shortage, for example, the overwhelming outputs of the Exeter's weather forecast factory had been reduced a single supposed truth, that 'climate change will lead to increased drought'.

Of course there is a political motivation captured within this end product, but there is also a politics of knowledge that transcends the whole chain through which it is produced.

In a recent paper published in 'Climatic Change' - Uncertainty, ignorance and ambiguity in crop modelling for African agricultural adaptation - I begin to unpack some of this politics of knowledge, by looking critically at how the growing complexity of climate impact modelling endeavours, and the journey that their outputs go on, are changing the industry of climate impact knowledge and the nature of this knowledge itself.

Exposing this politics is not about fanning the flames of often unreflective climate scepticism, but is rather a call for a more inclusive and transparent process of evidence production and evidence interpretation. I argue that from a more plural 'evidence-base', adaptation programmes, policies and interventions might respond to uncertainty and contextual appropriateness rather than to a reductionist and linear understanding of change.


This article was originally posted on the The Crossing.

Tuesday, 23 April 2013

Democracy in the Anthropocene?



Planetary boundaries / Illustration from Global Change magazine
STEPS Centre director Melissa Leach recently wrote in the Huffington Post: "When the cover of the Economist famously announced 'Welcome to the anthropocene' a couple of years ago, was it welcoming us to a new geological epoch, or a dangerous new world of undisputed scientific authority and anti-democratic politics?" Melissa's blog has provoked a series of fascinating responses and contributions to a vital debate about the planetary boundaries concept, the use of scientific expertise and authority within political processes, and the nature of democratic involvement in sustainability debates.

Melissa was reflecting on her experiences as part of a group of experts convened by the United Nations to discuss science and sustainable development goals. She was writing about a particular UN process, and did not claim that the concepts of planetary boundaries, the anthropocene or the scientists developing and working with these concepts, are undemocratic or authoritarian. Far from it.

However she did express concern that the anthropocene could neatly be aligned with top-down, rather than bottom-up solutions to our planet's most urgent challenges: "The anthropocene, with its associated concepts of planetary boundaries and 'hard' environmental threats and limits, encourage a focus on clear single goals and solutions," She wrote. "It is co-constructed with ideas of scientific authority and incontrovertible evidence; with the closing down of uncertainty or at least its reduction into clear, manageable risks and consensual messages."

The Huffington Post piece roused Roger Pielke Jnr, a professor of environmental studies at the Center for Science and Technology Policy Research at the University of Colorado at Boulder in to penning a thoughtful intervention on his blog, entitled Planetary Boundaries as Power Grab. Roger wrote: "For the proponents of planetary boundaries as political authority, issues of legitimacy and accountability are easily dealt with through the incontestable authority of science."

The pieces kicked off a very interesting discussion - which can be followed via the comment sections of both Roger's blog - where Melissa added further clarification about her original piece - and that of the Resilience Alliance's blog, Resilience Science. The latter became involved through a response to Roger's post from Victor Galaz, Associate Professor and Senior Lecturer in political science at the Stockholm Resilience Centre, where Johan Rockström and colleagues formulated the planetary boundaries concept.

Victor countered that: "There is no such thing as one homogenous "political philosophy" for planetary boundaries. And there is no power grab." He listed a number of "vibrant and diverse ways of studying and exploring the governance implications of planetary boundaries" that help explain how planetary boundaries can be used in open and constructive ways. His piece makes persuasive reading.

Following these debates, two PhD researchers at the University of East Anglia - Martin Mahony and Helen Pallett - have penned some rich reflections about the anthropocene on their blog, The Topograph. First Martin, explored the "relevance of the concept 'Anthropocene' to our understandings of how knowledge and politics, and nature and culture, are related to each other". And then Helen went on to talk about her belief that "as an emergent mode of thinking and acting the anthropocene is a potentially productive concept which goes beyond old certainties, assumptions and forms of action."

All of these pieces make fascinating reading, and the opinions expressed might well make you interrogate your own feelings and thoughts about the anthropocene, scientfic authority and the most effective ways to tackle the challenges facing our people and planet. May this constructive debate continue.

This article was originally posted on the The Crossing.

Monday, 22 April 2013

Dodgy data and missing measures: why good numbers matter (part I)

Earlier this year, an excellent short book, "Poor Numbers: How we are misled by African development statistics, and what to do about it" by Morten Jerven from Simon Fraser University in Canada was published (see this African Arguments piece for a summary). It makes the case that African statistics are often worse than useless, and decisions, rankings and other assessments made based on such poor numbers are usually grossly misleading. Jerven comments (page xi):

“…the numbers are poor. This is not just a matter of technical accuracy. The arbitrariness of the quantification process produces observations with very large errors and levels of uncertainty. This numbers game has taken on a dangerously misleading air of accuracy, and the resulting numbers are used to make critical decisions that allocate scarce resources. International development actors are making judgments based on erroneous statistics. Governments are not able to make informed decisions because existing data are too weak or the data they need do not exist”.

He argues that this appalling state of affairs came about through a long neglect of statistical services in Africa, made worse by the withdrawal of state support during the structural adjustment period. He focuses in on the iconic statistic, the gross domestic product (GDP), and a few countries, including Nigeria, Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania. GDP figures are made up of various elements, and in many countries in Africa, agricultural income is crucial. Yet, as Jerven shows for Malawi, there are all sorts of reasons not to believe the figures, as political incentives in particular result in distortions (in the case of Malawi massively upwards to 'prove' the 'success' of the politically driven fertiliser subsidy policy). Also, in much of Africa, the informal economy is massive, and very poorly understood.

There are ways of assessing informal economic activity, such as through assessing expenditures, but understandings remain often very limited. The result is that in countries where the informal economy is significant (most of Africa), there are large under-estimates in national income.

The consequences of all this are severe, the book argues. Planning and budget allocations are carried out on the basis of flimsy evidence, distortions arise as statistics are influenced by political interests, successes much hailed may be far from such, and in the endless pursuit of targets (driven for example by the Millennium Development Goal process), indicators may be meaningless, or the data simply made up or guessed. The highly popular country rankings on everything from GDP to good governance – including the latest offering coming from IDS (where I work), the Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI) – thus create their own political economy. Informed by dodgy data and the even more dubious process of 'expert judgement', many rankings may be worthless. Dudley Seers (quoted by Jerven, p. 36), who went on to become the founding director of IDS, had this to say 60 years ago:

"In the hands of authorities, such international comparisons may yield correlations which throw light on the circumstances of economic progress, and they tell us something about relative inefficiencies and standards of living, but they are very widely abused. Do they not on the whole mislead more than they instruct, causing a net reduction in human knowledge?"

A key complaint Seers was the lack of attention to the 'subsistence economy'. This he referred to as the "well-known morass which those estimating national income of underdeveloped areas either skirt, rush across or die in" (again quoted by Jerven, p. 37).

Yet such measures and rankings inform opinion, resource disbursement and provide competitive league tables to which governments respond, often exacerbating the poor numbers problem, as yet more dodgy data is conjured up, combined and ranked in ways that make little sense.

Zimbabwe is not covered by the book, but the core argument still holds, as I will explore further next week. The Central Statistics Office, now ZIMSTAT, has been the main source of government data since the colonial era. Compared to many countries, it has impressive capacity and a very strong track record. One thing that could be said of the colonial and Rhodesian authorities is that they were very keen on data. From the Rhodesian Yearbooks to the regular national income and expenditure surveys, data was collected, collated and compiled rigorously and consistently.

Statistics are after all about measurement and control – they are the very essence of the state, as the term suggests. In his brilliant history of statistics, The Taming of Chance, Ian Hacking relates how states were developed alongside statistical services, including cadastral surveys, taxation systems and population counts. In Jim Scott's terms the ordered, controlling and regulated way of 'seeing like a state', is very much wrapped up in counting, surveying and so being able to control, through a form of Foucauldian governmentality at the core of modern states.

While there are clearly negative aspects to this form of state capacity, there are also positive attributes. A committed developmental state cannot allocate funds, direct energies and plan for the future without a good statistical base. Negotiations with donors, steering of investments and prioritisation of expenditures are impossible. Equally, without solid data, political biases, bureaucratic whims and donor influence can overtake planning and budgeting to the detriment of developmental objectives.

Jerven concludes on the state of African statistics: "…the data are based on educated guesses, competing observations, and debateable assumptions, leaving both trends and levels open to question and the final estimates malleable (p. 108)… He continues: "Decisions about what to measure, who to count, and by whose authority the final number is selected do matter" (p.121). Which is why he recommends the revitalisation of African statistical services and, perhaps just as importantly, the improvement of capacity to interrogate and interpret data, including from qualitative insights.

Next week, I will turn to the implications for Zimbabwe more specifically.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland