Challenging misconceptions: Inclusive agricultural economies already exist in Africa

Eggs by Umma wa Wapanda Baisikeli Dar es Salaam (UWABA)
on Flickr (cc-by-nc-nd)

Often depicted as merely a begging bowl waiting for the munificence of superior westerners, Africa is seriously maligned. Indeed, across Africa citizens have always engaged in vibrant, innovative livelihoods activities, and these activities are ongoing. So when foreigners and Africans themselves imagine that inclusive agricultural growth can only come from foreign investment, they need to check the blind spots which render thriving African economic activity invisible.

For example, as presented by Marc Wegerif of Oxfam at the third day of the inaugural Conference on Land Policy in Africa, in Tanzania rural villages surrounding Dar es Salaam are already supplying the city’s massive food needs. Wegerif described how about 950,000 eggs were delivered daily by bicycle to the city, generating income for chicken farmers, those bringing the eggs to the city on bicycle, and the traders who sell the eggs in Dar es Salaam. People purchasing these eggs pay about half of what they would in a Dar supermarket, yet this route is more lucrative for chicken farmers than supplying to supermarkets. If the chicken farmers instead sold to supermarkets, the produce would not have the diversified multiplier effects that existing processes do, and yet, policy makers and foreign development practitioners often seek to encourage value chains to be geared towards supplying formal markets.

Wegerif went on to highlight how easily this economic activity could be enhanced if the Tanzanian government simply invested in building bicycle paths in and around the city. He told similar stories for milk (45,000 litres of milk delivered daily to Dar es Salaam by just one small producer project) and maize (33 tons of maize trucked to Dar es Salaam every week by one woman, who gathered maize by the barrow and ox car load from small producers). He discussed how these activities were preferable to pushing millions of small producers off the land to make way for large scale land based investments in agriculture. Wegerif emphasized that investment needed to take place in partnership with small producers, who are actually the drivers of African economic activity. If the problems of insecurity and poor infrastructure were solved, these activities would boom. The bottom line is that for African economic development, bigger and more concentrated are unlikely to be better, and in fact are likely to push smaller producers into further livelihoods hardship. He said African farmers are impressive, but are hampered by poor infrastructure and insecurity, including in some countries, harassment by soldiers.

Where to invest?

At the same time, said Madiodio Niasse of the International Land Coalition, African agriculture needs huge investments, but we have a choice whether to invest in existing producers and enhance their abilities, or to put aside existing farmers and take over their land with foreign companies adopting their preferred agricultural, land use, and trade model. Niasse pointed out that if we opened to foreign companies, we were going to lose control of our land and our countries, which would lead to increased inequality. The extent of foreign large scale land based investment in Africa at present meant that foreign land ownership was close to reaching the levels of foreign ownership under colonialism. Such asset loss would be detrimental to Africans. Niasse pointed out that it was easy to simply hand land over to foreigners and hope they would somehow allow Africa to prosper; going the route of securing African farmer’s land rights and building infrastructure was more complex and difficult, but in the end, security and investment would allow African landholders to prosper, while building African economies.

Have large scale land deals delivered prosperity?

Ward Anseeuw of the Land Matrix pointed out that the evidence was overwhelming that large land deals did not deliver on promises, particularly had failed to create jobs and provide livelihoods security for those who lost land through these deals. Indeed, he pointed out that nowhere in the world had large scale farming led to the levels of job creation that Africa needs. At the same time, since large scale agricultural projects cannot deliver on job creation, Anseeuw said rather than focusing on externally-driven, outsourced and hired labour solutions, African countries should focus on enhancing the viability of their many small scale producers. Even when projects created jobs, as Chrispen Matenga from the University of Zambia pointed out, African governments were held hostage against introducing minimum wages by the threat of retrenchments.

Instead of opting for solutions from outside, African countries need to undertake more territorial, inclusive spatial and political economy planning for African development, Anseeuw said. Inclusive agricultural growth in Africa could not be achieved simply by adopting international instruments; local people need to be involved in planning, implementation and monitoring to bring about inclusive growth. This starts with African governments having the guts to negotiate much more lucrative trade deals, rather than simply accepting the prices and terms of international markets.

By Rebecca Pointer, PLAAS

This post first appeared on the PLAAS blog.

Read other blog posts from the Conference on Land Policy in Africa.

7 ways to work for better land rights

Beekeepers in Ethiopia, ©Tom Pietrasik / Oxfam

What have we learnt from past efforts to secure land rights in Africa? And how can land rights be secured under different tenure regimes?

These are the questions that were tackled on the second day of the inaugural Conference on Land Policy in Africa, hosted by the Land Policy Initiative of the African Union, African Development Bank and UNECA, taking place currently at African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa.

Recognise and strengthen customary rights, starting with statutory recognition

Most of Africa’s land is held under customary land rights, and many of these property regimes are robust and have local legitimacy. Conventional land administration systems often fail in Africa, as they are not appropriately configured to address customary tenure rights.

Across the continent, there has been a move away from formal titling as the only or best way to secure rights. One of the main arguments in favour of titling – the ‘credit effect’ – has been been widely discredited. Customary tenure is the norm in Africa, not an aberration, and should be recognized and supported, not treated as an inferior form of tenure.

Policy, law and land administration need to recognise and secure rights held under diverse tenure systems. Individual land titling is a very limited type of formalization, which often fails to capture the complex and overlapping nature of customary tenure rights.

To what degree can statutory recognition of customary and other informal and unregistered property rights assist? While this provides a defence for local people against intrusions on their land, it does not clarify who holds what, and access to appropriate land governance and dispute resolution institutions. In particular, the inaccessibility of formal legal institutions of the justice system means that strengthening institutions from the local level is a key point of intervention.

Community, rather than individual, titling must be further explored as an option

At the same time, with enormously growing competition for land, and multiple threats of loss of tenure, there is widespread demand for registration or certification of some kind, and policymakers and practitioners need to respond to this.

Experiments with group or community titling of outer boundaries are an important innovation that has been implemented in a number of different ways in different environments, in Africa but also elsewhere, such as in the case of the Mexican ejidos.

Research is urgently needed to determine whether, in the recent cases in Africa, such as Mozambique, securing the outer boundary has provided effective relief against external threats to community land and natural resources and averted conflicts with neighbouring villages. We know that it does not automatically do so. How can community titling work for transhuman societies such as pastoralists, who assert collective rather than individual claims to land and related resources? Research is also needed to assess what impacts registering an external boundary and establishing local land administration committees has had on internal configurations of rights. Are rightsholders more secure?

Women’s land rights remain weak under customary tenure, but formalization is not necessarily the answer

Land grabbing does not only take the form of big corporate land deals – women are subject to having their land grabbed by extended family and local elites. Women who are trying to defend their land are subject to asset stripping, land grabbing and accusations of witchcraft. In these ways, women face the combination of traditional laws of inheritance with new challenges associated with growing urbanization, land demand and land values, as well as large-scale land-based investments.

Certification and commodifying land is not necessarily the answer. Even where statutory recognition is offered, women may be excluded through informal processes from becoming involved in land governance institutions. Land administration committees were established at kebele level to take forward certification, but only 7% of those participating in these committees were women. Men dominate dispute resolution mechanisms, and for these reasons there remain disparities between land policy goals and implementation. And while some policymakers favour the growth of land markets, these do not benefit women, especially poorer grassroots women. We need to understand markets as being gendered institutions.

Custom or rights for women? This is a false dichotomy

African traditional systems are patriarchal, treating women as dependents, despite their central roles in land use. This prevents women from participating in land administration processes and institutions.
A salient message from several sessions, including the plenary and the session on women’s land rights, was that neither statutory nor customary laws adequately protect women. The tensions and contradictions between global frameworks, national laws, and traditions and customs must be resolved through challenging customs to conform with women’s human rights. The challenge is to transfer the issue of women’s property rights from the private domain of the household to the public domain of human rights. This means working with and transforming traditional institutions, as these are the fora to which women turn when seeking justice, rather than the formal legal system.

Supporting women’s collective action is key

There have been positive experiences of women mobilizing to challenge discriminatory practices and institutions. Women can be supported to increase community awareness of gender injustice, even through processes that do not have an explicit gender focus, such as community mapping exercises to identify existing land uses and claims.

Women’s land rights can be strengthened through grassroots mobilization combined with supportive state institutions and wider alliances. Mobilization of women across rural but also urban areas can help to build broader coalitions pursuing their rights. Securing women’s land rights requires capacity building to equip women leadership skills to mobilise more women.

One priority is to design and implement new community justice mechanisms and processes, such as community monitors and community paralegals to intervene in violations of all people’s land rights. Again, interventions to secure rights in general can achieve real benefits for women, if appropriately designed. Women can collectively access services unavailable to individuals – for instance, a revolving loan fund based on women’s own savings and contributions from funding agencies enabled women to access land and engage a surveyor

Political leadership and evidence from research are needed to transform policies and practices
Parliaments have an important role in land governance: they approve, ratify and enact laws, frameworks and policies in their countries and regionally. They represent the communities and can sensitize and mobilize people on land policy issues. They also can approve budgets, and hold governments accountable, for land policy implementation.

They do, though, face constraints and the complexity of land issues requires parliamentarians to forge relationships with a wide variety of stakeholders. Parliaments can enact laws to strengthen transparency in land transactions, and to curb corruption, by requiring that Parliaments must consider and ratify large-scale land acquisitions above a certain size threshold, and all countries must have laws regulating large-scale land-based investments.

At the same time, promoting best practices requires us to have clear examples of positive customary systems – this is the foundation for evidence-based policy making. But evidence by itself does not change policy. Land is a profoundly political issue, and political leadership and support to challenge and transform. This requires working with national political leaders – in collaboration with regional and global bodies – to become champions of ordinary people’s land rights, and especially those of women, young people, and marginalised groups such as pastoralists.

Technical tools to secure land rights require wider policy and institutional support

Land rights tools should be implemented at country level to ensure that policies are implemented – but we need to learn about how multiple tools can be synchronized. There needs to be increased participation in interacting with the tools for in depth understanding of their application and particularly how civil society can make use of them and interrogate them.

The social domain tenure model (STDM), for instance, can be useful as information and planning tool for informal settlements. As a type of barefoot surveying, STDM is a bottom-up approach with a key role for the local community and both requires but can also strengthen partnerships among relevant stakeholders. It is key to include traditional leaders and community leaders and to ensure a mix of technical and social skills among implementing teams, to reduce land-related conflicts and to guard against discrimination, such as against women’s, young people’s and minority rights, in the course of implementation.

The third day of the conference will build on these discussions by focusing on inclusive agricultural growth: investment, productivity and land rights in the context of large-scale investments. Documentation and discussions are underway on twitter at #africalandpolicy and further information is available at www.africalandconference.org

by Ruth Hall, Future Agricultures Consortium Southern Africa Hub convenor and Associate Professor at the Institute of Poverty Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS)

This post originally appeared on the PLAAS blog.

Tackling land questions: Searching for systematic solutions amid a web of politics

Across the world, access to land and related resources are probably our most hotly contested political issues: who does the land belong to, who has the right to access the land, who gets to make decisions about land use, and who is barred from the land are tied to people’s history, culture and ability to pursue decent livelihoods.

In an effort to reduce contestation, most countries have developed complex systems of laws to govern land, some with more success than others. But for many African countries these are still open questions — with different systems of land governance, chosen and imposed, clashing, as countries try to keep space for traditional, customary land practices, grapple with the land legacies of the colonial era, while trying to make land systems that are legible to and compatible with globalised capital.

Amid these tensions, the inaugural Conference on Land Policy in Africa started on Tuesday 11 November 2014 at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. Contradictions abound: UN and World Bank aficionados praising the technical solutions many African countries are beginning to find, and the compatibility of these new systems with the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, while the reality ‘large scale land investments’ hit home with many African communities facing devastating land loss as a result.

And yet, there are some innovative solutions to addressing land questions. For example in Uganda, women have started coming together to actively contest customary and legislated land rights, as a group demanding attention and access with some success, as discussed by Joyce Nangobi from Slum Women Initiative for Development (SWID). Or the Social Tenure Domain Model (STDM) being used in Uganda, Zambia and Kenya to determine land rights. The model involves training and working with local people to mark off existing land plots using GIS and aerial photography, alongside community mapping, while also facilitating participatory processes among different stakeholders to negotiate and determine land rights locally.

What these innovations show is that technocratic top-down solutions are not the answer; whatever land rights are ultimately determined need to arise out of local relations, and governments need to become much more adept in navigating the local, taking cognisance of the particularities of each environment. This is not without challenges: whatever land rights are ultimately determined there will be winners and losers, so even when systematic solutions are found, they will still be political, open to change and contestation.

Determining the future of land in Africa cannot be a final solution — contestations will be ongoing, but if governments become more listening, more participatory and more responsive to the needs of people to access land, perhaps the solutions can be more equitable. Such approaches are not without their challenges — complexity being chief among them, but it is likely that negotiated processes can hold up against the tide of pressure to simply sell off land to the highest bidder — if there is political will.

By Rebecca Pointer, PLAAS

This post originally appeared on the PLAAS blog.

Gender relations and land reform in Zimbabwe

What have been the consequences of Zimbabwe's land reform for agrarian gender relations? This is a crucial question. If land reform was aimed at addressing historical racial imbalances in land ownership, has it also challenged gender inequalities?

Surveys have shown how many women gained land in their own right (and were granted 'offer letters'). Between 15 and 20 percent of new A1 plots are recorded as controlled by women. With inheritance of land, this may have increased marginally over time. The pattern in A2 areas was even more skewed to male control, with only around 10 percent being controlled by women; although transfers have been higher through inheritance in these farms.

Based simply on these figures, the record of land reform in addressing gender inequalities is poor. However, such assessments say nothing about the effects of land reform on gender relations, and the power, influence and control of assets of men and women in rural society. New work suggests contrasting interpretations, and interesting dynamics.

Some researchers have argued that land reform has opened up spaces of opportunity for women, whereby new livelihoods can be pursued, and a greater economic independence realised. This view has been emphasised by Patience Mutopo in her excellent study of women in a new resettlement area in Mwenezi district, in the dry south of the country. Access to land – often portions of husbands' fields – provided the route to building new trading enterprises. Mutopo traced the economic and social linkages that resettlement women created. It is a fascinating story, now written up in a book. It shows that economic and social empowerment does not have to come through the formal allocation of land to women, but many women are able to negotiate access to resources within existing marriage and other institutions, and make very good use of these opportunities. She argues that women 'can have remarkable bargaining power in certain domains'. She shows how new livelihood activities, notably trading involving travel away from the rural home, have meant changed gender relations. When women travel, husbands must take on domestic caring roles, including cooking and childcare. And with increased incomes, women may be the ones offering cash to their home-bound husbands when they return.

In a paper in Agrarian South by Mutopo, together with Jeanette Manjengwa and Manase Chiweshe, a series of cases are offered that show women accumulating in their own right. In the higher potential zones, agricultural production on the new resettlements was providing income that was being invested in school fees, home development as well as farming inputs. In the drier parts of the country, the cases showed women adopting more diversified livelihoods, including the use of natural resources for craft making and trading. Such patterns of accumulation are assisted through forms of collective organisation by women, facilitating trading, gaining access to markets or providing mutual aid to help out with domestic activities. Such new relations among women provide a basis for solidarity, assistance and economic organisation maximising the opportunities of the land reform, they argue.

In our work in Masvingo province we found a diversity of patterns across sites. New gender relations were being negotiated within households, as women gained economic independence and control over resources, separate from men. Simply having larger farms, and a greater level of production and income means that divisions of labour have shifted, with separate enterprises created, with different responsibilities. While in communal area homes, women have often managed to create some form of independence – growing their own vegetables, buying their own goats – the room for manoeuvre is limited, and with less income to hire labour from outside, women are often restricted to social reproductive activities, and providing labour for efforts controlled by men.

Those women who highlighted the benefits of land reform most enthusiastically in our study areas were those who had been marginalised and ostracised in their previous homes. These included single women, divorcees, and those who – for a range of reasons – had become outcasts in their communities, often targeted as 'witches'. The land reform areas offered a space outside restrictive, discriminatory, sometimes dangerous settings from where they came. For such women, these were genuinely liberated spaces.

However, others have highlighted that there are severe limits to such liberation. In a recent paper Manase Chiweshe, Loveness Chanoka and Kirk Helliker ask, based on data from Mazowe and Goromonzi, whether radical socio-spatial reorganisations such as fast-track land reform can destabilise forms of domination such as patriarchy. They conclude that patriarchy is so entrenched and the fast-track programme is 'highly masculinized', very often limiting opportunities. Bargaining with patriarchy, they argue, has limits. They quote one woman in Goromonzi who comments:

"The household setup is not fair, as men have full control of cash crops and as we women … are responsible for crops that are mainly for family consumption for example round nuts. The unfair part of it is, even if as women we sell surplus 'women crops', men's hands will be seen when monies get on the table. That is the reason why we also engage ourselves in other non-agricultural income-generating activities in a bid to widen our income base".

 

When so-called 'customary law' becomes extended into new resettlement areas women can become especially disadvantaged. In the early days of land occupation and the beginning of the fast-track programme, the new resettlements – as the old resettlements – were outside customary control, organised through Committees of Seven, linked to political and administrative structures. However over time, as Chiefs and headmen have exerted authority over the new resettlements, hybrid institutional arrangements have emerged.

In areas of land and inheritance in particular an increasing influence of patriarchal customary systems are observed. As Prosper Matondi comments in his 2012 book, the land reform 'has perpetuated the customary property rights in favour of men'. The implementation of new A1 permits may have helped to reverse some of this trend, as the more detailed permits now replacing 'offer letters' require both men and women to be named, and thus specify inheritance rights for women. This provides some protection of the imposition of 'customary' rules that frequently result of land and assets being taken by male relatives on the death of a husband.

As Chiweshe and colleagues point out, the burdens of social reproduction continue to fall substantially on women in the new resettlements. But in these new settings, the challenges may well have increased, with the lack of basic infrastructure. The distance to clinics for example can be substantial, and similarly water collection distances may be longer than in their former homes. While investments have occurred, these have been slow and limited, and most resettlement areas have few facilities.

There are thus highly contradictory effects resulting from land reform on gender relations. As Chiweshe and colleagues conclude "[al]though in large part insensitive to the land needs and rights of women, in some ways fast track nevertheless improved – albeit inadvertently – the lives of A1 women… Despite the prevalence of patriarchy as an intertwined system of structures and practices, women have sought to identify and open up gaps and pursue new activities as they manoeuvre their way..".

It is this active agency, involving negotiation, bargaining and generating creative solutions, that comes across strongly in these studies. While the power imbalances are clear, and gender discrimination widespread, this does not mean that women always lose out.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland

A1 permits: unleashing contradictions in the party state

On 2 July, President Mugabe launched the new permit system aimed at all A1 farms. Previously, Minister for Lands, Douglas Mombeshora, had announced that all previous ‘offer letters’ were null and void, and that everyone with land officially allocated in A1 resettlement schemes should apply for a new permit. These permits were aimed at regularising land tenure arrangements, and provide security of land holdings in perpetuity.

The permits, Mombeshora claimed, could be used as collateral to raise money from commercial banks. Both husband and wife would be named on the permit, and this would avoid any disputes around inheritance, offering women in particular security. The permits would come with conditions, however. They would not be issued to those who were not utilising the land, nor those who had been allocated land illegally outside the ‘fast-track’ allocations. A total of over 220,000 permits would be issued (although this seems high), and the first were handed over as part of a presidential ceremonial occasion at Chipfuri farm in Mhangura.

Some argued that the permits were illegal, however. Since compensation had not been paid for the land, the title deed is still notionally valid, and so no new land ownership arrangement can be applied. The ministry disputes this interpretation, but the issue of compensation certainly still remains very live, and must be a high priority.

On the face of it, the issuing of permits seemed to me like an excellent move. Indeed very much in line with arguments made on this blog before. Uncertainty about land tenure has plagued development in the new resettlements, and many had pointed to the limitations of the ‘offer letters’. A clearer, more transparent approach, with conditions and backed by an audit, would provide a firmer basis for planning and development efforts. Clear ownership arrangements would also offset attempts at ‘grabbing’ land by elites, or the growing practices of informal land allocation by a range of different authorities. The Ministry of Lands, backed hopefully by an improved land information system and greater clarity in land administration, would be doing its job.

However, rather than providing stability, normalisation and security, the announcement appears to have had the opposite effect in some places. A spate of land invasions has occurred again. These seem to have been in part prompted by the speech made by President Mugabe at the launch. Whether this was misreporting by the press or the president, as ever, was playing to the crowd, he was reported as saying that whites had no right to the land, and that ‘supping with whites’ through ‘fronting’ farms would not be countenanced. This has been interpreted variously as an affront to the Constitution, a racist attack and a spur for more land invasions, including of black farmers suspected of colluding with whites.

Emmerson Mnangagwa, minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, had to defend the president’s speech in parliament, arguing that it had been misinterpreted, and of course the President is fully committed to upholding the Constitution. Equally, Minister Mombeshora has reiterated that the land reform is over, invasions should not be allowed, and those moving illegally, for example into forest areas, would be removed in a crack-down on illegal land deals. However, some others may have not been listening to the parliamentary record and ministers’ statements, and in the last few weeks a series of, sometimes violent, invasions have occurred.

One of the most disturbing occurred in Masvingo East near our study sites. Black farmers on a series of farms, many purchased long before the land reform, were accused by war veterans of providing cover for whites and underutilising their land. Repeating an invasion that resulted in evictions last year, the farms were invaded again by a group of youths recruited from nearby areas, and there was a stand-off. This escalated into a conflict in which Mr Mufaro Mukaro was seriously injured in an axe attack, and remains in hospital. The local lands department say that the invasions are illegal and the occupiers should go. The local MP and deputy agriculture minister, Davis Maripira, condemned the attack. But the situation remains tense, although the lead war veteran was arrested.

Other invasions have occurred in Mazwi nature reserve near Bulawayo; in Goromonzi associated with an ownership wrangle with local big wigs, and disputes over periurban housing offered as part of election sweeteners last year; as well as in forest estates in the Eastern Highlands. A violent attack in Guruve earlier in the year also occurred, leaving Malcom Francis and his daughter Catherine both dead, signalling increasing insecurity for remaining white farmers. William Stander of Benjani ranch in Mwenezi also recently lost a Constitutional court contest to retain his farm. The most recent invasion, garnerning substantial publicity through activist Ben Freeth, was the attempt by deputy presidential secretary, Dr Ray Ndhlukula to take over Figtree farm in Matabeleland South, despite a High Court ruling against this.

Just as we thought that a sensible, ordered reform of land tenure and ownership was to happen, backed by a long-called for audit, then confusion and uncertainty emerges again. The recent period is a telling sign that Zimbabwe has a long way to go before a formal, effective and accountable bureaucratic state is allowed to operate. The Ministry of Lands under Mombeshora has been trying to move in this direction, recognising the urgent need to move on from the land reform to rebuild agriculture and spur rural development. Yet political factions within the party state, including perhaps inadvertently the president, but also senior members of his own office, are resisting this move to a normalised situation. Political and personal benefit can be gained from instability just as it has been over 14 or more years.

Others resisting are those disappointed with the way the state is moving to regularise things, and so exclude some from potential future spoils. And there are those too who are disillusioned with the party, including core supporters inside the war veteran movement, seeing it as selling out in its attempts to become ‘acceptable’ to the international community in the post July 31 2013 era. Jabulani Sibanda, the notorious war veteran leader, commented recently: “This is a struggle; this is war against multiple black farm owners. Some of them have farms registered under the names of their children who are not even in the country. We will take such farms and redistribute them. We are against land hoarders and people who have too much land; excess land to be precise,”

As discussed last week, the complex manoeuvres, the competing factions, and the layers of commercial and political interests at the heart of the ZANU-PF state can result in all sorts of contradictory and conflicting results. So within one month, we had a move to regularise and formalise land tenure, along the lines that many had long been calling for, and yet a reaction that resulted in more violent land invasions.

Those stuck in the middle, including many ministers, civil servants, but particularly people on the ground, including frontline government officials, find it difficult to navigate a way forward. They urgently want a clear, transparent system to prevail in line with the Constitution; and with whites involved in the new agrarian system, contributing in multiple ways. It is no wonder, as discussed last week, that things are stuck, and reforms and the economy are not moving forward as fast as many, including many within ZANU-PF, hoped.

By Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland

Engaging parliamentarians on large scale land investments in Africa

Africa needs agricultural investments that facilitate inclusive and broad-based growth.  The investments must be transparent and fair in order to respect and protect the land rights of the rural communities and women.

These issues were highlighted by the Pan African Parliamentarians (PAP) and Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) Parliamentarians Forum in a workshop co-organized by the International Institute for Sustainable Development, Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, African Land Policy Initiative, International Land  Coalition, the Land Policy Initiative of the African Union, European Parliamentarians with Africa, Oxfam, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Future Agricultures Consortium, Africa Forum  and NEPAD. The Conference was held in Johannesburg from 11-12 August 2014.

The conference was the fourth and final one in a process that has taken place in the four sub regional parliaments of West, East, Southern and Central Africa African parliaments respectively.

The Pan African Parliamentarians were appraised of the achievements by the Pan African parliament since it launched a campaign to raise awareness against of Large Scale Land investments in 2010 by the researchers, community members and policy making institutions. Parliamentarians were provided with evidence based stories of ongoing research on the phenomenon through academic papers, policy briefs, video evidence and testimonies from affected women and civil society organizations that work with these communities. The video recorded by the Zambian Land Alliance highlighted tangible experiences of the affected communities to the Pan African Parliamentarians.

The presentations echoed the lack of transparency in contract negotiations; disproportionate livelihood loss, unsustainable business models and consistent weak governance and poor oversight and lack of readiness on the part of the African continent to negotiate effective contracts.  The few positive cases were still experimental, few and far between.  Legislators were challenged to reflect on the current investment models and provoked through the presentation of alternatives and different ways of thinking about large scale land based investments.  Although the campaign to engage regional parliamentarians in the debate on large scale land investments was a success, the PAP proposed measures have not yet implemented at the national levels.

Parliamentarians’ response showed their increased appreciation of the dynamic of large scale land based investments in their countries.  They also singularly and collectively decried their weak oversight ascribed to, among other clauses in the investment contracts which prohibited public disclosure of contracts. The turnover of parliamentarians linked to their five year term of office was also cited as another factor that undermines their capacity to exercise their mandate and sustain the momentum.  The Pan African Parliament has 10 committees and yet member countries second five parliamentarians to PAP. The result is that some countries are not represented on five committees. This further undermines the reach and effectiveness of the Pan Africa Parliament and its resolutions. The Pan African Parliament lacks resources to invest in the knowledge production for parliamentarians. This was attributed to the failure to pay subscriptions by member states.  The legislators also cited limited resources, lack of information and the failure by their member states to ratify and uphold regional and international instruments that they ratify.

Parliamentarians also cited their limited powers to enforce regulations and resolutions on national governments as another challenge. It was also clear that parliamentarians do not share a common understanding of the issues raised and challenges posed by large scale land based investments. This was evidenced by the type of clarifications that they MPs seek from the participating experts. The lack of a common language also posed some barriers in debates and sharing and dissemination of information among members of the PAP.

Here are suggestions to improve the effectiveness of Pan African Parliamentarians’ role in improving the governance of large scale land transactions in Africa:

• Continuous supply of evidence based knowledge on the large scale land based investment and their impacts in Africa
• Technical secretariats to support committees with skills, knowledge and continuity of debates throughout the parliamentary cycles. The same secretariat would also monitor and evaluate progress on land based investments
• Sub regional engagement on the subject through regional and national parliaments
• Parliamentarians need to demonstrate and motivate political will at the highest levels of the government to address the staggering public investments in agriculture.

By Gaynor Paradza and Emmanuel Sulle

The challenges of agriculture: attitudes of Senegalese young people from the Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey

Photo: Kaymor, Senegalese schoolgirl
by angela7 on Flickr (cc-by-nc-sa)

In February and March 2013, the Senegalese Afrobarometer team conducted a nationwide Survey on a sample of 1200 young Senegalese people aged 18 and above. The sample is representative of the 18+ population and takes into account the distribution by district, sex and place of residence.

As in previous surveys, the Senegalese team inserted some country-specific questions into the standard questionnaire of the African network. These included a question on the extent to which respondents agreed with the following statements:

1. Q80A_SEN. Promote economic growth by: support to farmers/rural areas versus prioritize industry/urban areas
2. Q80B_SEN. Promote economic growth by: technology and agricultural inputs versus access to markets
3. Q80C_SEN. Promote economic growth by: focus on producing cash crops versus food crops
4. Q80D_SEN. No foreigners to buy land versus foreigners can purchase land
5. Q80E_SEN. Work in agriculture; produce for consumption or sale.

For the four first questions, regarded as categorical variables, the 7 possible answers were as following:

• -1 Missing
• 1 Agree very strongly with 1
• 2 Agree with 1
• 3 Agree with 2
• 4 Agree very strongly with 2
• 5 Agree with neither
• 9 Don’t know.

We attempted to see if the perceptions of young people about these agricultural issues differed from that of other age groups. Then, among the young people, we tried to control by sex and place of residence.

For purposes of analysis, the age variable that was continuous was re-coded as a categorical variable. The latter was assigned two modalities: youth (under 36 years old) and adults/old people (more than 36 years old).

Variables Q80A_SEN, Q80B_SEN Q80C_SEN and Q80D_SEN (see above) were re-coded again and each of them were assigned 3 modalities: Agree with 1, Agree with 2 et Agree with neither.

When we crossed the 4 variables with age, only one relationship was statistically significant: it is the relationship between Q80B_SEN (promote economic growth by "technology and agricultural inputs versus access to markets") and the "age group" variable.

Modernize agriculture first, then open markets

Depending on their age, people give priority either to new technologies and improved inputs such as machinery, fertilizer, and seed quality or to improve access to markets with better infrastructure and communication pathways.

As we examined the conditional distributions, it appears that:

• 79% of young people argue that economic growth should be pursued through modernization of agriculture (new technologies, inputs, improved seeds and machines), while 20% argue that the investment must be focused on improving market access with better infrastructure and communication channels and one person is indecisive;
• Among adults and the elderly, 83% favour economic growth through modernization of agriculture (new technologies, inputs, improved seeds and machinery); 13% argue that the investment must be focused on improving access to markets, with better infrastructure and communication channels; and 4 people remain undecided.

These distributions show first of all that, whatever their age, the majority of respondents believe that economic growth must be achieved by modernizing agriculture. In fact, 4 out of 5 people agree with this proposition. The idea of working with traditional farming methods is seen as a serious obstacle to the agricultural sector's contribution to economic growth and development. However, compared to adults and the elderly, young people are more likely to attach importance to agricultural markets and everything that facilitates the storage and disposal of products (infrastructure and communication channels).
In sum, it appears that the perception of young people in agriculture is holistic as it incorporates all the modernization of the sector, from production to conditions surrounding the sale of products.

Young people perceptions about land grabbing, agriculture modernization and support to rural farmers: do gender and residence area matter?

There is a dependent relationship between gender and attitude as far as the land grabbing is concerned (p-value <5%). Girls and young women are less favorable than young men to the granting of land to foreigners: 75% of women (3 out of 4 women) would be hostile to the fact of granting of land to foreigners. Among young men, the proportion is 64%.

The difference in attitude is explained by several factors. Women are at the heart of household economies that would be more weakened by a decline in agricultural production resulting from land grabbing. In addition, given their lower level of qualifications, they are at a disadvantage compared to men in terms of employment offered by the new operators. Another reason is related to the fact that men are more likely to benefit financially from land transactions with foreigners. Finally, women are less affected by migration than young men, but they are more affected by the alienation of local resources.

Similarly, there is a dependent relationship between place of residence and attitude to land grabbing (p-value <5%). Rural residents are more likely than urban residents to be opposed to the sale of land to foreigners: 76% of rural respondents do not want land to be sold to foreigners, compared to 68% in urban areas. The most obvious hostility towards rural land sales is explained by the fact that these lands are located in rural areas.

Compared to young men, girls and young women are more favourably disposed to agricultural investment in rural areas and agricultural modernization. Bivariate analysis between these variables and gender are all significant at the 5% level.

90% of girls and women interviewed favour the promotion of economic growth through support to farmers and the rural area of residence, while 10 say that support should be given to industrialization and urban areas. In comparison, 84% of men are in favour of supporting farmers and rural areas against 16% who believe that priority should be focused on industrialization and urban areas. So girls and young women appear to be more interested than young men in investment in rural and agricultural modernization.

The reasons we have previously advanced to explain these differences in attitude and perception are valid here. They are more attached to rural areas (because less affected by migration), and they are heavily dependent on agriculture and the benefits they can get from it (for instance, economic gains and empowerment).

In conclusion, these results show the importance of identifying the perceptions of young people in agriculture and strategies aiming to promote it. Beyond this, clear differences appear in these attitudes, depending on the respondents’ gender, place of residence, educational level, marital status, and other factors.

By Mohamadou Sall

Related: Three reasons why Senegal needs to rethink youth, farming and development

Land Rush, Day 1: Food availability doesn’t always equal food access

While proponents of corporate farms argue that large scale land investment will enhance food security, activists and academics alike are highlighting how detrimental such land deals could be for the food security of those who are moved off the land to make way for corporate farming.

Speaking at a meeting of the Pan African Parliament yesterday, parliamentarians, civil society, academics and agribusiness came together to discuss how to make large scale land investment work for Africa.

Civil society activists, such as Constance Mogale from the Land Access Movement of South Africa (LAMOSA), highlighted how moving women off land to make way for investors meant that women could no longer produce food to secure their livelihoods. As this leaves affected women all but destitute, they also cannot access the food being produced by the commercial farm which had replaced their activity. Food security for the poor and vulnerable is often not about availability, but about access. Increasing production through commercial farming, therefore, does not help those who do not have cash to purchase their food.

Echoing Constance Mogale’s point, Prof Ruth Hall (PLAAS/Future Agricultures) explained that large scale land deals are not just creating land loss, but are actually restructuring the entire food system towards a model in which the food system is controlled and owned by multinational corporations. Corporate farming is leading to the supermarketisation of the food system, limiting access for those who cannot pay. She gave the example of South Africa, where most food is produced by the corporate sector. South Africa is food secure, produces abundant food and even exports food, yet many South Africans are going hungry, simply because they cannot afford to buy it.

While African governments enter into investment deals under the belief that large scale commercial farming will improve the lot of the hungry populations, the evidence from these examples suggests the opposite: these types of land deals often make the vulnerable even more vulnerable. Therefore it is essential that African governments look more closely at the fine print of such deals. They must ensure that the benefits of investment will accrue to their populations, not just to profit-hungry corporate investors.

by Rebecca Pointer, Institute of Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) 

Comparing communal areas and new resettlements in Zimbabwe IV: accumulating assets and investing in the land

One of the striking findings of our earlier work on the new resettlements was the level of investment that was going on in the resettlements – in houses, wells, toilets, farm equipment, transport and, above all, cattle. This investment has continued, and indeed expanded.

But the question has been raised, what is the baseline against which this success is measured? How do we know what is a lot or a little? One way is to compare with what has happened in the communal areas: the areas where many in the new resettlements came from. Is the ownership of assets higher, and the rate of accumulation greater in the resettlements? And if so, what does this say about the 'success' of land reform?

Let's start with housing and shelter, a very basic human need. Many other studies have shown that housing is often the first thing people invest in when acquiring new land. It is so fundamental, and the basis for further accumulation. Housing per se does not reduce income poverty, but by improving the quality of life, and the level of comfort, it is an important route to accumulating and investing. Certainly in the mid-2000s we found people building like fury. Many structures were permanent brick ones, with thatched or tin/asbestos roofs. There was considerable expenditure, and much labour invested. People had camped for months in the bush during the invasions and in those days the communal area amenities looked very enticing. The new settlers were therefore insistent that getting homes established was a priority. This was about marking out the territory, asserting the right to remain in the absence of often even an 'offer letter', let alone something more secure. But it was also about making life reasonable: having somewhere dry or warm for the family to live in.

By 2011-12, 83% of houses (excluding kitchens/granaries) in the A1 sites were brick built, with 1.9 such structures per household on average. This compared to 86% in the communal areas, with 2.3 house structures per household compound. Thus by 2011-12, the resettlements had almost reached the level of housing investment that existed in the communal areas that they had left. While there were plenty of fancy homes, with tin/asbestos roofing, glass windows and the rest, in the resettlement areas, there were still fewer than in the communal lands, reflecting the length of residence time, and demands on investment. In the building realm, there is clearly more to aspire to.

In terms of water and sanitation, 63% of households in the resettlements had built toilets by 2011-12, a substantial leap from five years earlier. But this was still less than in the communal areas, where the figure was 78%. In terms of water sources too, the resettlements are catching up. An average of 0.3 wells were built per household in the five years before the survey in the resettlements, compared to 0.06 in the communal lands. In the communal area sites 74% of households had access to household water through such communal wells, while in the resettlements it was 49%. Private well ownership was again higher in the communal lands at 24% compared to 14% in the resettlements. 14% of homes in the resettlements still collected water from an unprotected dam or river source, while none did so in the communal areas.

These different patterns reflect the longer period for investment in the communal lands, and the fact that in the 1980s and 90s, government and donors invested considerable amounts in water and sanitation, particularly communal boreholes. By contrast, resettlement investments have been largely independent of state or donor support, and focused on private and community initiatives. Investment is continuing, as witnessed by the rate of well digging, and it will not be long before the resettlements have water and sanitation coverage at a level of the communal areas, but without 30 years of external investment.

The rate of investment in farm equipment has also been significant in the resettlements. 80% of households have an ox plough, many several, with an average of 0.5 ploughs per household being bought in the past five years. This contrasts with 73% ownership in the communal areas, with only 0.15 having been bought per household over five years. Ox cart ownership is also higher in the resettlements (at 52% of households compared to 49%). Only cultivators have a lower ownership level at 25% of households in the resettlements compared to 32% in the communal areas; although 0.1 cultivators per household was purchased over the previous five years on average, showing a pattern of continued accumulation in the new land reform sites.

A similar pattern is shown with transport. In the new resettlements 48% of households own a bicycle, while this is only 38% in the communal areas. 0.45 bikes per household were bought over the previous five years in the new resettlements, compared to 0.2 in the communal areas. The contrasts are more dramatic for cars (21% ownership compared to 5%) and tractors (6% compared to 1.6%). Transport is seen as vital to livelihoods in the new resettlements, given the larger distances, poor transport infrastructure, and lack of public transport.

We also looked at two other items, once deemed 'luxuries' now seen as essential: cell phones and solar panels. These have been bought in large numbers in all areas, although the rate of purchase in the previous five years has been a bit higher in the resettlements (1.7 per household versus 1.2 per household for cell phones, and 0.6 per household versus 0.5 per household for solar panels). Everyone needs to be connected now, and this helps on multiple fronts, from agricultural marketing to family relations. And having electricity for lighting at night improves rural living no end, improving health, enhancing education for kids, and making sure that you are up on the latest news, football scores and soap opera dramas.

But the big story in the resettlements is livestock, and especially cattle. Comparing the A1 villagised sites in Gutu, Masvingo, Chiredzi and Mwenezi clusters with their counterparts in nearby communal areas, the average cattle ownership per household is 6.6 v 5.0, 5.7 v 3.5, 4.9 v 6.3, and 9.5 v 12.3. Thus in the drier areas, it is the communal areas that have the larger herds on average, but this is reversed in the other sites. Again focusing on the A1 villagised sites, 98% of those in the top 'success group' (those doing the best, according to local criteria), while 80% of those in the middle group and 73% of those in the bottom group had cattle. This compared to a pattern of 80%, 93% and 50%, over all sites. Cattle ownership is thus better distributed in the resettlements, with more people, across all groups, having access to animals for draft, milk and meat. Donkey ownership shows a comparable pattern, with 24% of the top success group owning donkeys in the resettlements, 9% in the middle and 5% in the bottom. This contrasts with 19%, 10% and 3% in the communal areas. The pattern though is however reversed for goats, as across success groups (top to bottom), 57%, 44% and 37% of households own goats in the A1 villagised schemes, while 71%, 68% and 45% own goats in the communal areas. This reflects the high herding costs of goats, and the difficulties of managing them in the resettlement areas.

Since the terrible droughts of the early 1990s, livestock populations across the country have recovered. In the economic chaos of the 2000s, investing in livestock made even better sense, as the formal currency lost its value. As sources of draft power, access to draft animals – whether cattle or donkeys, or some combination – is vital, and boosts production potentials. This is why the new farmers have invested so heavily in this key asset. It is not that communal farmers have not been accumulating too, but the new resettlement farmers have been doing so faster and across a wider group of people than in the communal areas, particularly in Gutu and Masvingo areas.

Investment by new resettlement farmers remains impressive. It is clearly differentiated by site and by households within sites, but the continued investment in housing, equipment, transport, livestock and so on is impressive. And is especially so when compared to the communal area patterns, where investments are less extensive and less well distributed. In the resettlement areas, the data reflects a broader based accumulation from below, with investments focused on improving the effectiveness of farming, as well as the living conditions on the new farms.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland
The on-going Masvingo study research is conducted by Ian Scoones, Blasio Mavedzenge, Felix Murimbarimba and Jacob Mahenehene.

How have the ‘new farmers’ fared? An update on the Masvingo study I

It is now nearly over four years since we finished our book, Zimbabwe's Land Reform: Myths and Realities. Since then we have not been idle. We have continued research in all our study sites and extended our work to new areas, including in the Highveld, as well as in nearby communal areas. We have also continued to publish our results and debate the findings, and this blog has become an important focus for some of this.

Many people have asked how have Zimbabwe's 'new' (not that new anymore) farmers fared in the last few years? In the next four weeks I will offer some updates from our on-going data collection. We now have nearly 14 years of data from our sample of 16 sites and 4oo households in ‘new resettlements’ across Masvingo province. Longitudinal data offers important insights on dynamics and trends not available from snapshot surveys or roadside assessments. We have not fully analysed all the data (there is a lot of it!) and there are some journal articles in the works, but we thought we should share preliminary results now, as the formal publication process can take ages.

So what has happened since 2009-10? In some important respects the conditions have improved since the stabilisation of the economy since 2009, and the ending of hyperinflation. But equally there have been few major investments in agriculture in this period, as the government remains broke, the donors have shied away from supporting the land reform areas, and beyond individual farmers' investments, wider private investment has been limited. Also the weather has been bad, with rainfall below the average in every season from 2008-09 to 2011-13, although of course it has picked up in this last season.

In our 2010 book, we reported a picture of expansion and growth, and significant investment, concentrated in the A1 sites, and particularly the self-contained resettlements. At the same time, A2 farms were struggling with limited investments, and those with sugar plots had suffered badly from low prices, and poor payment systems. It was a mixed picture, but one that showed a significant group of 'accumulators from below', particularly in the A1 schemes who were producing surpluses regularly, selling some of these, and reinvesting in their farms.

Has this pattern persisted in years since? In 2011-12, we conducted a follow up survey to find out. This was carried out across all the sites, and involved the 400 households from our original sample (although with turnover in households, there were both new entrants and replacements in our new sample – more on this in a future blog). In addition, we collected crop production and sales data for the same group in all seasons (up to the 2013 harvest).

What did we find? Overall, we found remarkably similar overall patterns to before. The A1 self-contained farmers were doing by far the best, while those in the A2 sites were still struggling, although by 2012, the sugar farmers were back on track. Meanwhile those in 'informal' sites were doing better than before, partly we suspect because the uncertainties over their land had been reduced, with one group in Uswaushava having been granted 'offer letters' after a long struggle. Tenure it seems does make a difference, but it doesn't have to be the gold-plated freehold version.

Cropped area had not increased in the way it had during the 2000s; indeed in some sites it seemed to have declined a bit, although it's not clear why. The process of land clearance and expansion occurred mostly in the 3-4 years after settlement and the rate of expansion then declined. There is it seems not enough labour or draft power to plough more, hence stability or decline in arable areas (again with some exceptions). This even includes the A2 areas, where capital shortages, and lack of equipment, have constrained agricultural expansion for most.

Why is all this painstakingly collected longitudinal data important, and what does it tell us?
First, it shows that the Masvingo study sites are far from the situation sometimes portrayed in the media. There is a wide array of activities. Not everyone is doing well, but a significant proportion continue to 'accumulate from below' and invest in farms and farming. This is most prominent in the A1 sites, especially the self-contained versions.

Second, despite repeated droughts, a considerable amount of food is being produced, and sold. The mismatch between dire predictions of impending shortage and the reality as it turns out has been commented on before. This is in part due to the production occurring in the new resettlement areas that often goes unaccounted for in general food security assessments.

Third, there is a pattern of differentiation emerging that means only some are doing well while a significant proportion are failing to meet livelihood needs. These differences within and across sites is quite stark and suggests the need for targeted policy responses.

Fourth, the lack of investment and support in the new resettlements continues, and this means that basic improvements are not occurring. Yields for example remain stubbornly low, and this is less to do with seeds and fertilisers (although supplies of both have been a challenge), but more to do with water control in the dry area of Masvingo. Without irrigation there are high variations in crop output between years that has to be compensated for by non-farm activities of various sorts.

The data suggests ways forward for government, donors, NGOs, farmer organisations and others wishing to support the 'new farmers'. It suggests a focus for intervention (irrigation, flexible credit and basic rural infrastructure to reduce costs would be the top three in my view); it highlights a need to rethink food security and livelihood assessment; and it suggests the need to take a differentiated response to policy and support, contrasting for example the 'accumulators' and those who are struggling. None of these are new suggestions; indeed they all appeared in our 2010 book. However, the updated data simply reinforces their importance, and the urgency of doing something on the ground.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland.

The on-going Masvingo study research is conducted by Ian Scoones, Blasio Mavedzenge, Felix Murimbarimba and Jacob Mahenehene.

Engendering CAADP: What must be done in the next 10 years?

by Ruth Hall

A wide-ranging debate about the past 10 years of CAADP acknowledged that the process has been largely gender-blind. There was broad agreement that, in the next 10 years, CAADP must make visible women’s investment in agriculture and address the challenges of the future by reorienting agricultural investment towards women and towards sustainable agriculture.

There is widespread consensus that African countries still invest too little in agriculture. Only 7 of 49 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have consistently reached the Maputo Declaration budget target of 10% investment in agriculture.

Smallholders dominate in agriculture, but not in visions for the future of agriculture. 90% of agricultural production comes from small farms and smallholder farms contribute 40-60% of rural incomes, as people combine farming with non-farm activities. While it varies across countries, women contribute between 50% and 80% of the agricultural workforce.

Rudo Makunike of NEPAD presented on the progress and lessons learnt from 10 years into the CAADP process, there are now 40 country compacts and 28 national investment plans. ECOWAS and COMESA both have regional CAADP compacts. Achievements include greater political commitment to agriculture, higher budget allocations, mobilised stakeholders around a common agenda, and promoted regional integration and coordination. CAADP has promoted not only production but also value addition.

Fatou Mbaye from ACORD and Ruchi Tripathi from ActionAid presented analysis from a joint report by their organisations, entitled ‘From rhetoric to action’ and ‘walking the talk’. Their research shows that, across much of the continent, agricultural research is mostly top-down and supply-driven. African governments need to increase investments in sustainable agriculture, by spending more on research and extension services and reorient them to address women farmers’ priorities. This requires involving women in defining research priorities.

Among the recommendations from ACORD and ActionAid were to improve the quantity and quality of public investment, increase the role of farmers’ cooperatives, re-orient spending priorities to focus on women farmers, step up investments in sustainable agriculture that reduces input-dependency, and ensure land tenure for women smallholder farmers.

CAADP is a useful framework because it recognises agriculture as it is helping to reverse the marginalisation of agriculture in the development agenda. As Ruchi Tripathi argued, CAADP has been positive: it pushes coordination among ministries and focuses donors’ efforts; and National Investment Plans have led to increased investment, but CAADP has not yet delivered to women smallholders. National Investment Plans and CAADP compacts are all consistent with the CAADP framework, but none of these prioritise smallholders and smallholder women in particular.

The biggest private investors in African agriculture are women smallholders, so both public and private investment should be in them. The litmus test for all CAADP planning should be this: what would a women smallholder like in terms of agricultural spending?

A concrete suggestion put forward in the discussion was that rural women smallholders’ associations should be supported to meet before CAADP meetings to organise themselves as a caucus to influence multi-stakeholder engagements.

Shingaidzo Mupindo from FAO argued that, if women had the same resources as men, they could increase production from their farms by 20-30%. Even if you connect smallholders to markets, when it comes to who controls the money, husbands will say to a wife ‘did you bring land here?’, suggesting that male claims to the land remains the basis for control over incomes, despite women’s labour contributions.

FAO’s approach is to partner with governments and others to promote the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, to provide technical capacity, to link land access and tenure security to investment and production growth. Yet she recognized that these processes have not yet touched ordinary women smallholders.

Some criticisms of CAADP are that there is a multiplicity of initiatives and a risk of bureaucratization – too much talk, and little action. There is a compelling need for attention to livelihood needs. In the coming 10 years CAADP will be on using public investments to leverage private investments, and promoting ‘wealth creation’. There was some skepticism about this, and how it would be defined, who would acquire this wealth and the degree to which it would ensure benefits accruing to women.

Several clear themes emerged from the discussion.

Agreement about gender blindness of CAADP
In discussion, there was general agreement that the CAADP process has been gender blind, but disagreement about whether there is real change underway towards redressing this. CAADP is collaborating with the NEPAD Gender Unit, to see how CAADP can respond to gender issues, and is to launch a ‘gender fund’, but this was criticized as relegating women to a ‘special interest’ category, rather than redirecting agricultural budgets more generally. NEPAD confirmed that there would be opportunities to participate in the gender review process.

Agreement about limited implementation of CAADP
There is also a generalised non-implementation of CAADP because there remain major funding gaps in the NAIPs, which governments hope to fill from private investors and donors. There’s also a big difference between the budget and actual spend. So the challenge is to increase capacity to implement plans, as well as to reorientate the plans themselves.

How to promote sustainable agriculture and agroecological farming?
Promotion of input-intensive production methods biases agricultural programmes against women smallholders. There is hostility towards sustainable and agroecological farming among decision-makers, and CAADP is not helping to reverse this. Women carry an unfair burden of food security, which itself is severely compromised. The IAASTD (International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology for Development) report said its key message is this: small-scale farmers and agroecological production methods are the way forward to solve the food crisis.

How to hold states accountable for investment?
The private sector only invests where there are prospects, and the state has to invest to create conditions that shape investor behavior in ways that benefit women, and don’t displace them. There was some debate about agricultural growth corridors like SAGCOT (Southern Agriculture Corridor) in Tanzania and ProSavana in Mozambique and whether these are excluding women smallholders.

How to influence CAADP?
NEPAD’s role is to coordinate it, but CAADP is driven and determined primarily at country level, and it is up to governments to popularise it. NEPAD acknowledged that it may not be known by farmers, if it is to be responsive, then farmers – especially women farmers – should be at the centre of planning and determining priorities. ActionAid’s suggestion of women smallholder caucuses being organised ahead of CAADP meetings was the most concrete suggestion to address this.

Agricultural investment models for replication and scaling up: Ways forward for achieving gender equitable agricultural commercialisation?

By Christine Okali

Land accumulation by investors or investment companies for large-scale farming to the disadvantage of small-scale farmers is part of the framework within which gender equitable agricultural commercialisation is being discussed in the Agricultural Investment, Gender and Land in Africa conference. Days 1 and 2 of the workshop detailed the diversity of such investments – referred to as ‘Business Models’. Case study evidence demonstrated the often disadvantaged terms on which women, in comparison with men, are incorporated into these schemes, regardless of the investment model. The debate around the disadvantages faced by women in labour markets has already been explored in the feminist literature, along with the understanding that their persistence reflects how deeply gender bias is embedded across a range of institutions. The transformation of rural production systems, their increasing commodification and the individualisation of productive resources, are likely to be experienced very differently by women and men.

Identifying successful models for replication and scaling up
One key message rising from the multiple case studies is that there are many different schemes, some of which have changed in structure since they were started: different companies and individual investors producing a range of different products, with varied arrangements for the incorporation of farmers and labourers. Possibly the most consistent feature of many cases is the reported lack of adequate planning, along with poor implementation making the identification of “success” highly problematic. Adequate planning for investments that rely on local populations for their functioning involves an informed analysis of the local social context.

In terms of gender, and gender relations, a number of case studies point to the need to detail which men and women are involved, and in what capacities. Are the men and women involved in the schemes spouses working together on a ‘family farm’; or young men or women with few responsibilities, possibly depending on others to meet their food needs? This information would seem to be especially important to the success of the scheme if there is a presumption that farmers and/or farm labourers involved in the scheme will need to continue with any food crop production in which they are already engaged. This concern about the need to continue producing food for consumption featured strongly in the discussions on the second day of the conference. So, are the local men and women involved as independent farmers working on their own plots using hired labour; as hired labourers working for cash; or as family members working on household farms working as out-growers? There are of course other possibilities.

In terms of married women, and the allocation of their labour, it is their labour burdens that dominate the understanding of the term ‘gender sensitive investment outcomes’. Is there evidence that these burdens will increase as family farms increase their levels of commercialisation? Related to this issue of home food production are concerns about child nutrition.

One or two cases were presented of what might be called ‘model companies’ in terms of their labour relations and the terms of employment for women. These companies and their business models now deserve particular research scrutiny.

Land investments in Africa: It's all about responsible governance

by Sue Mbaya, Land Policy Initiative

In the midst of all the controversy, there is likely to be agreement that LSLBI have come to occupy center stage of the land debate in many parts of Africa – rightly or wrongly. I say rightly or wrongly because there will be many who are of the view that African States have many other, more significant challenges to deal with - democracies that are at risk, persisting poverty, recurring conflicts challenges, the worst levels of maternal and child deaths in the world – just to name a few. Consequently, to some actors the ongoing storm over LSLBI is valuable resources and attention on these other urgent and priorities. All this may be true, but perhaps a closer look at this perspective is warranted.

What does the issue of LSLBI and the majority of Africa's ills have in common? Quality of governance. A review of the concerns most frequently raised in relation to LSLBI points back to the quality and robustness of governance institutions at all levels as well as the inadequacy of legal and regulatory frameworks for the governance of land and related resources. Indeed the 2009 Declaration on Land Issues and Challenges in Africa adopted by African Heads of State was premised on a recognition of the need for strong systems of land governance in order for land to contribute to sustainable socio-economic growth, development and the security and livelihoods of Africans.

Since the adoption of the Declaration on Land, African Union has sought to progress the land governance agenda through the Land Policy Initiative (LPI). The LPI was established by the African Union, African Development Bank and the UNECA in 2006. Improving land governance is about giving due recognition and protection to the land rights of local communities in land laws and facilitating security of all bundles of land rights, interests and claims, especially for women and other marginalized groups. Improving land governance is also about strengthening land institutions and processes involved in the implementation and oversight of land policy and administration. In response to these imperatives, and to the centrality of LSLBI to land governance and agricultural development in the region, the LPI has been leading a process to develop Guiding Principles on LSLBI in Africa.

The proposed African-owned Guiding Principles build on the global momentum to improve the governance of LSLBI. This includes processes such as the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security and the ongoing process towards Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investments in the Context of Food Security and Nutrition. The LPI Guiding Principles are also the culmination of a series of processes and evidence from across the continent focused on addressing the challenges faced by Member States in their efforts to ensure that LSLBI promote equitable economic growth, peace and prosperity for their people.

Importantly, the LPI Guiding Principles serve to facilitate the implementation of the AU Declaration on Land Issues and Challenges in Africa and the Comprehensive Africa Development Program (CAADP) by providing policy direction and guidance to inform LSLBI in African agriculture. As such, the Guiding Principles are a basis for commitment by cooperation and mutual responsibility amongst AU Member States, other stakeholders and investors to improve the governance of LSLBI in Africa.

Coming back to the controversy surrounding LSLBI, one can project that the controversy will continue along with the demand for Africa's agricultural land in the face of ever increasing global population, dwindling agricultural land resources most developed economies and rising global food prices. The urgency is self-evident for African States to establish a framework for LSLBI which provides profitable opportunities for investors while supporting national development objectives and respecting the rights of local communities in African countries. This is why the efforts of the LPI to improve land governance are so critical.

And yet, improving governance is also about bringing the citizens and their concerns to the center of the debate in line with the guiding African aspiration 'that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny'. After all, the rationale for African State engaging in LSLBI is to promote development and end poverty for Africa and her people. Hence, for the Guiding Principles to be truly African owned and promote African priorities, they must reflect the voice of the diverse African citizenry. To this end, during the month of March 2014, the LPI will invite stakeholders from government, private sector, academia and civil society, including farming constituencies, to deliberate on and provide their view on how the Guiding Principles should be finalized.

For more information on the Guiding Principles on Large Scale Land Based Investments in Africa and the stakeholder consultation process, please contact landpolicy@uneca.org.

Sue Mbaya is a consultant for the Land Policy Initiative. The views in this article do not necessarily reflect the view of the Land Policy Initiative.

Transparency and governance in the land sector: two sides of the same coin?

By Anna Locke, ODI and Future Agricultures Consortium. 

Lake Nakuru Lodge by shankaronline on Flickr

This article was originally posted on the ODI website.

 

Related:

• Large-scale land acquisition: can we overcome transparency’s ‘dirty secret’? by Anna Locke and Andrew Morton
• Making land deals more transparent

Land transparency has been on the public agenda again since the G8 summit in June this year. Two events in the same week in October showcased the issue: the Open Government Partnership annual summit in London (which publicised the recent Open Government Guide on Land), and the Global Soil Week conference in Berlin, which dedicated a session to partnerships for responsible land governance – an issue that is rarely discussed by soil scientists.

A couple of things hit me from these recent discussions. First, the public discussion has broadened from land transparency to land governance. The G8 communique published in June does not refer to a land transparency initiative as such but talks about ‘global activities to improve land tenure governance’.

Transparency served as an immediate umbrella to bring together different initiatives in a very short time in the run-up to the G8 summit 2013 but seems to have been a launch pad rather than the end point. Similarly, the Open Government Guide on Land focuses on land governance while acknowledging the need for transparency, participation and accountability at the heart of open government.

 

I welcome this broader agenda as it provides more of a framework to see how transparency can effect meaningful change.

 

However, at the risk of being pedantic on this issue (I have form on this – see my blog on the World Bank conference) once again, I want to pin down the terms of the debate and look at the underlying assumptions. It is important to make sure that we are all talking about the same thing, particularly as we prepare for an ODI Roundtable on the whole issue of Land Transparency in December.

 

First, definitions

What is land governance? The Open Government Guide on Land defines it as a series of processes, including recognition, registration and enforcement of land tenure rights, land-use administration, management planning and taxation, information provision and dispute resolution.

 

It then identifies the elements that characterise good governance: governments should help to ensure that these processes are ‘clear, transparent and fair… [with] human rights of citizens protected’; that they include ‘accountable decision-making about how best to use land… improving the openness’ [of those processes, I assume]; and that they ensure ‘consultation with those potentially affected by changes… [which] can help communities and households protect their rights’.

 

The Guide suggests the Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) mechanism launched by the World Bank as the main reference point for a baseline evaluation of the state of land governance. The LGAF measures governance in five thematic areas: legal and institutional framework; land use planning, management and taxation; management of public land; public provision of land information; and dispute resolution and conflict management. In turn, the main reference point for the LGAF is the World Bank’s definition of governance as the ‘manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services’.

 

I would be more specific on two things. Yes, the discussion of land governance highlights the issue of how institutions can carry out the work of land titling, registration and administration. But it also needs to look at how they take and implement decisions on land – who takes part in decisions on land allocation, use and management, and how different interests in competing social and economic functions of land are reconciled. That goes beyond consultation. Indeed, it goes to the heart of the political economy of decision-making and the power relations that are involved. This is recognised implicitly in the Open Government Guide in its recommendation for participatory land and resource use planning.

 

And what is the role of the private sector in all of this? Does the shift (back?) from transparency to governance mean a refocusing on governments, instead of the broader private sector actors targeted under pre-G8 discussions? These have been targeted directly through efforts to increase contract disclosure and public provision of information on holdings.

 

Second, what is the relationship that is assumed between transparency and governance?

The G-8 Communique talks about the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure as ‘providing global policy guidance for good land governance and transparency’. So are they of equal importance or does one feed into the other?  

 

The Open Government Guide takes the transparency of processes as a central element that feeds into governance (openness and accountability are others). The LGAF recognises the role of transparency in promoting better governance in the land sector, particularly in land-use restrictions, valuations, expropriation, the transfer of public to private land and in levying fees for different services provided by governments. Its emphasis on the provision of information, particularly through registries and cadastres, is the starting point for transparency in any form.

 

The work of ODI (ADP, PoGo) and others, such as Global Witness, on transparency reveals a growing recognition of the importance of transparency for good governance. But it also shows that transparency is not enough, on its own to achieve the standard of governance in the land sector that we are striving for. This was also acknowledged in the Berlin discussions in October.

 

So, what can we take away from this? I see three key lessons.

1. Yes, the shift to a broader perspective on land governance is useful. But we need to acknowledge areas of agreement and difference on what we mean by governance, particularly in the presence of conflicting interests in land processes, and recognise the role of the private sector.
2. We need to be clear about the role of transparency in promoting good governance – transparency and governance are not two sides of the same coin although progress on one depends on progress in the other.
3. And finally, let’s carry the debate on the pathways from transparency to accountability to meaningful change into the debate on governance. This means talking about the content, timing and transmission of information; mechanisms and timescales to ensure meaningful participation and consultation; and getting accurate indicators that measure impact, not just processes.

All of these will issues will be on the table at the ODI Roundtable on Land Transparency at ODI on 10 December and we look forward to a rich debate.

 

Thanks to Giles Henley, ODI Research Officer, who provided useful comments on this blog.