Land policy for the next decade: Taking stock and moving forward

The inaugural Conference on Land Policy in Africa got off to an energetic start on Tuesday 11 November 2014 at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, with a panel of eminent speakers issuing a clarion call for action to secure the land rights of rural residents across the continent. Dr Abebe Haile Mariam, Director of Rural Economy and Agriculture in the African Union Commission, chaired this first plenary session and opening ceremony.

Land and agriculture are central to our future
Her Excellency Rhoda Peace Tumusiime, AU Commissioner for Rural Economy and Agriculture, officially opened the conference, declaring: ‘We are proud that Africa is the only continent that has defined its own agenda for land policy.’

‘This conference is timely and allows us to track progress in the implementation of the AU declaration on land,’ she said.

Her Excellency further observed that, in Africa, about 60% of the population derives its livelihood and incomes from farming, yet Africa’s agriculture is yet to match the needs of its growing population. The Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) is the collective approach to addressing this limitation, and to promote sustainable land management. As Her Excellency insisted, agriculture will remain key to our continent’s transformation, and will need to provide employment opportunities and livelihoods to our growing population.

His Excellency Ato Tefera Derbew, Ethiopia’s Minister of Agriculture, endorsed such sentiments. He welcomed participants and issued a challenge to all national governments: with Africa’s substantial land resource, he said, the situation of low productivity and food security is ‘not acceptable’. He called on AU member states to ‘diligently implement our continental guidelines’.

A strong foundation has been laid
A core message from the inaugural ceremony was that Africa has already laid a solid basis to secure land rights. Speakers reflected on the progress made over the past five since the African Union heads of state Declaration on Land Issues and Challenges in Africa. There is now widespread agreement that ensuring secure and equitable access to land and natural resources is essential, especially in face of increasing economic and population pressures.

European Union ambassador to the African Union, Gary Quince, emphasized the partnership and collaboration that has been forged between the EU and AU, with the EU now supporting land tenure programmes currently in ten countries. Quince pointed out that, since the AU Declaration was adopted five years ago, a lot has happened: Africa has enjoyed good economic growth, and the importance of agriculture has been recognized, while at the same time the continent’s population has increased by over 100 million. Many challenges remain: there has been an upsurge of conflict across Africa, displacing many thousands of people from their land and livelihoods, and large acquisitions are increasing.

Women’s land rights must be at the centre
If African states are to secure land rights for their citizens, then women must be at the centre of policymakers’ concerns. Speakers concurred that women are the main users of rural land for both production and reproduction.

‘We will work to ensure that marginalized groups and women’s voices are brought to the fore’, promised Kafui Afiwa Kuwonu of Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAf).

She referred to the rural women’s initiative in 2012 under the slogan ‘Our Land, Our Life’ and indicated that civil society groups had met in the past two days to plan how to support rural women to advance their cause. Their initiative would culminate at a gathering of rural women from across the continent in Kilimanjaro in 2016. She issued an appeal to participants to join this initiative to ensure that rural women are at the centre of all discussions about land and other natural resource rights.

Josephine Ngure of the African Development Bank supported these sentiments, arguing that patriarchal systems have discriminated against women, reinforced by land laws that have tended to cement the discriminatory inheritance rights. If law and policy are to redress gender imbalances, she reasoned, then both customary and statutory laws need to be transformed to strengthen women’s access and control of land. This must be done in recognition of human rights, but also in recognition that women are the primary users of agricultural land in Africa.

Civil society is on board to partner in implementation
Kuwonu of WILDAf also spelt out how civil society organisations intend to use the platform provided by this conference: to share experiences and to challenge policymakers, but also to inspire participants to forge ahead with implementation and to be part of the solution.
‘We commit to disseminate information on land policy and collaborate in efforts and to share best practices’, she promised.

It’s about politics
While land rights and land tenure are longstanding challenges, these issues are receiving more attention from governments, especially in the wake of the food price hikes from 2007/8 and other global factors that have contributed, together with domestic demand, to growing large-scale commercial pressures on land. While all speakers agreed on the need to secure existing customary and informal rights to land, there was an evident tension in where they placed their emphasis. Is the priority to secure existing property rights for those who already occupy, use and claim land – or to facilitate the commodification of land rights so that they can be more readily transacted? How can these competing priorities be squared in practice? These questions will no doubt animate debates among conference participants over the coming three days.

How to secure rights in a context of rising demand for land?
At the centre of the politics is the rising demand for arable land. Kuwonu of WILDAf declared: ‘The issue of land in Africa is at the heart of our concerns… Land is coveted by all, including farmers and fishers, but it is also subject to new demand from outsiders.’

Josephine Ngure of the AfDB argued that ‘land grabs’ which have been described as the ‘new imperialism’ are giving rise to problems of governance. Global changes are bringing new impacts on Africa’s land, with growing demand for food, energy and water supplies, and growth in foreign direct investment in land. A key challenge is for Africa to have policies that can manage the risk of loss of land rights by the poor. In this context, how can we provide security while attracting investment, and how can we do this while ensuring our people have access to land?

As Susan Minae of FAO astutely observed, while there is a need for technical expertise and governance solutions: ‘Securing land rights is not just about governance, it’s about politics!’

Leadership
To confront such competing imperatives, in the real world of politics, Africa needs strong leadership. Aisa Kirabo Kacyira of UN-Habitat declared, to nods of agreement from the audience: ‘Leadership is needed where the common good is in conflict with the private good – and land is such an area that calls for leadership.’

Without leadership, she observed, things can go wrong. The engagements at this conference, then, between policy makers, practitioners, civil society and academics, are crucial for strengthening such leadership.

Land is about industrialization as well as agriculture
Several speakers emphasized the importance of land tenure and land use management in facilitating wider economic and social change. Stephen Karingi of the UNECA pointed to the role of land in supporting national development priorities. He observed that this event builds on the Malabo Declaration, which called on African states to leverage natural resources to drive national economic growth and industrialization. In this context, land is a strategic resource and Africa needs a new sense of determination to take strategic control over its resources and maximize its value from this capital. Land has been used as the foundation of economic development elsewhere in the world, and promoted food production. In light of this, he argued, where large-scale land-based investments happen, these must be in support of national development priorities and in line with land policy guidelines.

Land is an urban issue too
Africa is the least urbanized continent, but is urbanizing faster than anywhere else, at double the global rate, making sustainable urbanization an urgent priority for policy and planning. As Kacyira of UN-Habitat insisted, we need to use this resource that has been a source of conflict and make it a driver of security and prosperity.

A new phase of operationalizing policy principles
We’re into a new phase – indigenizing these, operationalizing them in the national context in each member state, and learning from practice. The principles are well established, but how are these to be interpreted and to operationalized in the very diverse national contexts? Now is the time to focus on practice, and learning from practice. How do we bring evidence into policy?

How to secure land rights, to improve agriculture, and how to ensure that land rights of smallholders are protected against speculation and large acquisitions?

This moment is auspicious, coming in the AU Year of Agriculture and Food Security.
Complementing the AU Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy are the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security. Several speakers agreed that, together with the new AU Guiding Principles, these constitute a formidable basis for inclusive and sustainable investment in land while securing land rights.

A flagship sharing and learning event for Africa
Speakers reiterated their appreciation for the Land Policy Initiative, jointly convened by the AU, AfDB and UNECA, and the valuable work it does. In convening this event, they observed, the LPI is helping to promote evidence-based policy making. This ‘flagship’ sharing and learning event for Africa will enable knowledge to be shared which can support evidence-based policy and implementation.

Inclusive growth in agriculture?
In the inaugural ceremony, relatively little was said about what form inclusive growth in agriculture means, and how it can be achieved. Yet most speakers alluded to the tensions between the rights agenda and the need to increase investment, re-investment and productivity. Kacyira of UN-Habitat commented: ‘Even though land symbolizes life, it only supports life when it is translated into viable incomes that can help people to meet their needs.’

Securing land rights is not, by itself, enough, as the existing rural population needs investment in their own production. How this can be achieved, and what lessons have already been learnt, will be addressed in detail in the conference sessions over the coming three days.

by Ruth Hall, Future Agricultures Consortium Southern Africa Hub convenor and Associate Professor at the Institute of Poverty Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS)

Note: The Guiding Principles on Large Scale Land Based Investment, endorsed by Heads of State in April 2014, are to be officially launched on the second day of the conference, on the morning of Wednesday 12 November 2014.

This post first appeared on the PLAAS blog.

Research in Gender and Ethics (RinGs): A new partnership to build stronger health systems

Gender-sensitive health policy is a feature of international commitments and consensus documents and national-level normative statements and implementation guidance in many countries. However, there are gaps in our knowledge about how gender and ethics interface with health systems. Funded by the UK Department for International Development, this exciting new initiative brings together three health systems focused Research Programme Consortia (RPC): Future Health Systems, ReBUILD and RESYST in a partnership to galvanise gender and ethics analysis in health systems.

Our approach

As the partnership is concerned with ensuring that new approaches get translated into action, we have an interest in embedded approaches; analysis that is relevant and owned by local actors. In addition, an understanding of intersectionality is central to our work. Gender intersects with other axes of inequality, such as age, ethnicity, class, poverty, geography, (dis)ability and sexuality. Finally, in addressing power relations and social exclusion we also call attention to ethics in health systems research, policy and practice. 

What are our aims?

This partnership seeks to understand, and to encourage, a gendered approach to the study of health systems care-seeking; financing and contracting; governance; and human resources for health by:

1. Synthesising the current evidence base. This will provide tools, case studies and guidelines on gender, ethics and health systems for researchers and decision makers and set the terms of a future research agenda.
2.  Stimulating new research. Through small grants aimed explicitly at RPC partners and affiliates.
3. Encouraging mutual learning and research uptake. A learning platform will support grantees, RPC members and a wider stakeholder group (policy makers, implementers and advocates) to share and support one another in defining, conducting and applying this research. Dialogue will engage with research findings and encourage its use in policy and practice.

Who is involved? Find out more

A small team is steering the direction of the project:

• Asha George, Future Health Systems/Johns Hopkins School of Public Health
• Sarah Ssali, ReBUILD/School of Women and Gender Studies, Makerere University
• Sally Theobald, ReBUILD/Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine
• Sassy Molyneux, Resyst/KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Research Programme
• Kate Hawkins, Pamoja Communications
• Rosemary Morgan, Cross RPC /Johns Hopkins School of Public Health

Our email address is rings.rpc@gmail.com

Over time a broader group of RPC researchers will also join the projects, either as the recipients of research funding from our small grants project or as part of our learning platform. Do get in touch if you would like to learn more.

COP19: Cutting edge policy research

The ESRC STEPS Centre is seeking to address the many different impacts that climate change has on peoples’ lives and livelihoods in sustainable ways that work for people and planet, using their own knowledge and expertise through our research with partners around the world.

The COP19 United Nations summit on climate change in Warsaw, Poland (11-22 November 2013) will play a key role running up to crunch negotitaions in Paris in 2015, where a new global climate deal will be agreed.

The STEPS Centre’s energy and climate change co-convenor Rob Byrne will take part in a side event at COP19 exploring how the Technology Mechanism can deliver green growth that better meets the needs of lower income countries. For delegates, Rob will be running a stand from 18-22 Novermber featuring cutting edge policy research findings about low carbon energy, development and technology transfer.

A selection of our key resources on the impact of climate change on poor and marginalised people in developing countries are gathered here:

Projects:

• Energy and Climate Change domain With increasing access to modern energy services a key international development priority, the STEPS Centre believes a much broader and ambitious approach to energy and development is needed.
• Political Ecologies of Carbon in Africa New deals and funding mechanisms aim to reduce emissions. One consequence of this is the growth of a market in carbon. This project examines the power, politics and perceptions of carbon in Africa as new schemes are planned and put into action.
• Uncertainty from Above and Below How do people deal with uncertainty about the climate? Theories, models and diagrams from “above” may have little to do with the way how everyday men and women live with, understand and cope with uncertainty. This project brings together the views of people who study uncertainty, with the perspectives of people who experience it.
• Pro-poor, low carbon development This project aims to improve the transfer and uptake of low carbon technologies in developing countries, and to do so in ways that can assist in their economic development.
• Environmental Change and Maize Innovations in Kenya
  In East Africa, maize is an important staple crop, a vital part of food security. This project examined the various options for farmers in the region – from choosing alternative crops, to using new techniques or technology. It looked at how farmers and others see and make these choices in the context of climate change, uncertain markets and changes in land use.
• Low Carbon Innovation in China This project explores the extent, nature and social implications of low-carbon transitions in China, a key concern for the whole world.

Publications:

• Working Paper: Energy pathways in low-carbon development By Rob Byrne, Adrian Smith, Jim Watson and David Ockwell
• Briefing: Energy Pathways in Low carbon development
• Briefing: Pro-poor, low carbon development: Improving low carbon energy access and development benefits in Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
• Journal article: Enabling adaptation? Lessons from the new ‘Green Revolution’ in Malawi and Kenya Sally Brooks
• Article: Green grabbing: A new appropriation of Nature? By Melissa Leach, Ian Scoones, James Fairhead
• Resources collection: Green-grabs
• Special issue, Water Alternatives – Water grabbing? Focus on the (re)appropriation of finite water resources
• Working Paper: The Politics of Agricultural Carbon Finance: The Case of the Kenya Agricultural Carbon Project by Joanes O. Atela
• Working Paper: Biocharred Pathways to Sustainability? Triple Wins, Livelihoods and the Politics of Technological Promise by Melissa Leach, James Fairhead, James Fraser, Eliza Lehner
• Briefing: Biochar: “Triple Wins”, Livelihoods and Technological Promise

Recent blogposts:

• Building pathways of pro-poor energy access
• Getting series on climate action: why science is never enough
• Exposing the political journey of climate change evidence from Exeter to Africa

Key People:

• Rob Byrne, STEPS Centre energy and climate change co-convenor Video: Rob Byrne talks about the STEPS Centre’s energy and climate change research
• David Ockwell, STEPS Centre energy and climate change convenor

Responsibility at the Science-Publics-Policy Interface: What I learnt at the 2013 Science in Public Conference

The village of Onna, after the 2009 L'Aquila
earthquake. Photo: Darkroom_Daze (Flickr)

by Stephen Whitfield
DPhil Student, Institute of Development Studies

This year's 'Science in Public' conference hosted by Nottingham University was excellent. I came away from two captivating days of presentations, discussions and (at times heated) debates having learnt a lot… and inevitably feeling frustrated in the knowledge that there was so much more to be learnt from the panels that I wanted to, but couldn't, attend.

This is my attempt to summarise the ideas and messages from the conference that most challenged and changed the way that I think about science and society.

Science in Public
In 2012 this annual conference series, which was originally known as 'Science and the Public', underwent a radical name change, becoming, as it is today, the 'Science in Public' conference. OK, so it's not a particularly drastic change, but this subtle alteration reflected an important discontent about the separation of science and public as distinct spheres of operation. Of course, such a distinction is neither straightforward nor necessarily appropriate, as I'm sure almost everyone at the conference would agree – with the possible exception of the keynote speaker Harry Collins (whose presentation was aptly described in the most popular tweet of the conference as 'unusual').

'Science in Public' – which gives a nod to Gregory and Miller's 1998 book – although perhaps slightly clunky, makes more sense than the previous name. In fact, what was clear across the panels was that science operates within multiple publics; that publics operate within science; and that politics, policies and power pervade. But the organisers can be excused for not opting to host the "Science in Publics in Policy in Science in Policy in Publics in Science" conference, which in all but name the conference was.

Across the panels that I attended, a number of really interesting ideas were expressed about how the components of the science-public-policy nexus relate to each other.  I summarise some of those that I found more surprising here:

• The public are primarily concerned with how science is governed (even at very early stages). Karen Parkhill (Cardiff University) presented a fascinating report on her involvement in running public consultations around the SPICE (Stratospheric Particle Injection for climate Engineering) geo-engineering project.  She said that much of the public concern was not necessarily about the specific risks and benefits of the project, but that the project should be guided and regulated by structures and processes of good governance – that research funders and policy makers were being closely consulted about issues of uncertainty; that international governments were involved in the conversation around these; and that these conversations should be happening even at the early stage of project feasibility evaluation.
  
  
• Funders and scientists must consider the diverse political implications and impacts of 'basic' research. Richard Jones (University of Sheffield) pointed out that there has been a funding shift in the UK from 'applied' science to 'basic' science (which focuses more on explaining fundamentals rather than developing products), and as a result there is more pressure on basic science to demonstrate impact. Kirsty Kuo, an engineer working on the SPICE project, described how she came to realise that even a feasibility study, which aimed to better understand the materials and properties of a tube that might ultimately deliver particles into stratosphere (and carried no direct risks or benefits), had political implications. She explained that concerns about the message that such a test may send out about the UK government's long term geo-engineering intentions, ultimately led to the study being cancelled.
  
  
• Policy makers need a better understanding of the processes by which science is legitimized. Franca Davenport, a specialist in science communication from the University of West England, pointed out that there is an appetite for and intention to pursue a pluralistic form of evidence-based policy amongst policy makers, but there are a number of challenges in translating multiple evidences into policy. One particular challenge is to be able to make judgements about evidence (a point that also came out in Harry Collins' keynote), and central to this problem is that policy makers are not familiar enough with the processes (and subjectivities), such as peer review, through which science generates legitimized and accepted evidences. She argued that science communicators could have a role in bridging this gap between the processes of the science community and those by which evidence is translated into policy.

It seems that there are particularly important roles to be played for those at the interface between science, publics and policy. One of the strong themes of the conference was that the roles and responsibilities of science communicators and science media centres are contested, conflicting and often poorly defined, but nevertheless crucial.

Rethinking Responsibility
Coming to the conference, I was familiar with, but by no means an expert on, the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) agenda (pdf) and I was relieved to discover at the conference that there isn't really a standard interpretation, accepted definition, or application of the concept of RRI within Science & Technology Studies that had somehow passed me by.  Discussions over what RRI means – the how, why, what, by who, and for whom – took place throughout the two days. The panels led by Jack Stilgoe, which focused specifically on this subject,  were particularly engaging and evidently inspired new ideas, the seeds of which were emerging within the discussions themselves, and I'm sure will be developed as a consequence of them. I was struck by two points in particular:

• Responsible innovation is also about making sure that innovation happens. Richard Jones made the point – which on reflection seems blatantly obvious, but it came as somewhat as a revelation to me – that responsible innovation is not simply about safeguarding publics against inappropriate or risky innovations; it's also about the responsibility of ensuring that beneficial and important innovations do make it to markets and publics, such that the benefits are optimised and that innovation continues to be encouraged and motivated to progress. As such, responsibility relates not only to scientific processes or to the end products of innovation, but also to the pathways of innovation, involving critical and inclusive reflection on the risks and benefits associated with the possible (and uncertain) future trajectories of research and innovation.
  
  
• We have a responsibility towards scientists. I am much more used to thinking about responsibility as something that scientists do for the public, so it was really eye-opening to hear from people considering the reverse relationship in terms of responsibility. I was fascinated to hear Ikuko Kase (University of Tokyo) talk about how Japanese scientists who had participated in public engagement exercises around the Fukushima earthquake and nuclear plant incident had been 'wounded' by the experience, during which they had felt politically conflicted and had been publicly criticised.
  
  This situation was echoed in the case of the Italian scientists prosecuted for the public predictions they made about the L'Aquila earthquake, a case study that was recounted by Giuseppe Tipaldo (University of Turin) at the conference. Ann Kerr (Leeds University) made the point, in relation to some of her work on the careers of post-doctoral researchers in health innovation, that there is a need to recognise a responsibility of care towards scientists and innovators. It was clear from the cases of Japan and Italy that some of this responsibility must fall on publics, media and policy-makers.

Responsibility is a concept that remains up for negotiation, and cases were differently made (and critiqued) for it being founded on principles of 'justice' and 'care' and involving attitudes of ambivalence and processes of anticipation, reflection, inclusion and response. But what is clear is that responsibility is multidirectional and cuts across the complex relationships that make up the science-publics-policy nexus.

I really look forward to reading the accounts and reflections of others at the conference, which also included sessions on social media (including a live link-up to the International Congress for History of Science, Technology and Medicine in Manchester); 'science versus the greens'; storytelling as a means of public engagement with science; and the role of science fiction in the social construction of science and technology – all of which I wish I could have attended. I'm sure that the ideas and thinking that the conference has sparked will lead to some really interesting and insightful outputs within Science & Technology Studies over the coming months.

This article was originally posted on The Crossing.

The Politics of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement

As the 31 July elections near, reflection on the period of coalition government under the 2009 'Global Political Agreement' is useful. This severely tested the ability of a true 'unity' government, and the assessments of achievements are mixed. While economic stabilization was an important achievement, many other issues remain to be dealt with, leaving any new government a precarious situation.

A useful overview of this period is provided in a book edited by the leading academic and political commentator, Brian Raftopoulos. The Hard Road to Reform: the Politics of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement (published by Weaver Press in Harare, and also available in e-format for Kindle) is a good guide, written by a number of leading Zimbabwean commentators, many of whom have been involved in the MDC formations over the past period. It is a sanguine account, confronting the real politik of Zimbabwe head on. While ZANU-PF's machinations are critiqued, the MDC groupings are not spared either.

The book offers, from a set of particular perspectives of course, an important primer for thinking about the next steps. July 31 and its aftermath will give us more clues as to what may lie ahead.

Timothy Scarnecchia has offered a helpful summary overview and review on African Arguments that I reproduce here. It gives some helpful excerpts from the six chapters in the book, and highlights some of the main points very well.
The following is reproduced directly from African Arguments:

Chapter 1: Brian Raftopoulos: "An Overview of the GPA: National Conflict, Regional Agony and International Dilemma"

Here is Raftopoulos' helpful summary of the GPA period:

"The GPA and its many challenges was the product of a convergence of factors, namely: the unwillingness of a party of liberation to accept electoral defeat; the inability of the opposition to claim state power due to the militarisation of the ruling party's response to defeat a clash of different notions of state sovereignty in which the electoral wishes of the Zimbabwean citizenry were subordinated to selective nationalist claims of the ruling party; and the role of SADC in facilitating an agreement that attempted to balance the need for regional sovereignty against outside interference with the legitimate electoral demands of the Zimbabwean electorate. The results of this complex mix of ingredients was a brew that placed a short term halt on the rapid political and economic decline in the country and opened up some space for new political arrangements, while also providing an authoritarian regime with opportunities to regain lost ground. The period of the Inclusive Government generated a new set of dynamics that made it impossible for ZANU-PF to return to the status quo ante, while also exposing the strengths and weaknesses of the former opposition parties as they took part in unequally shared state power." [28]

As Raftopoulos states in the introduction, it is important to focus not only on the MDCs' ability to maneuver in the GPA years, but also to focus on how ZANU-PF has managed to use these 4 years to regroup. He writes: "The politics of ZANU-PF is not only one of destruction and obstruction; it is also constitutive of the new social and economic forces that have emerged in the last 10-15 years." (xv). While the issue of ZANU-PF political violence is raised in the introduction and elsewhere in the collection, it is noticeably absent given the amount of emphasis the Solidarity Peace Trust's Reports have previously given to this element of Zimbabwean politics. It is perhaps one of the book's strengths, however, to focus on the shifting political landscape, especially the changing constituencies and interests represented by ZANU-PF and the opposition, rather than continue to focus solely on the repressive actions of the past 13 years.

Chapter 2: James Muzondidya, "The opposition dilemma in Zimbabwe: A Critical Review of the Politics of the Movement for Democratic Change Parties under the GPA Government Framework, 2009-2012."

Historian James Muzondidya, a research manager at the Zimbabwe Institute, a think tank well known for its links to the MDC, takes a particularly critical look at the performance of the MDCs during the GPA, but he first notes the limits on their actions:
"…the ability of the opposition parties to use their leverage during this phase has been restricted because ZANU-PF is not interested in any reforms that would loosen its hold on power. While agreeing to some of the reforms negotiated in the GPA, ZANU-PF was bent on using them and the new institutions to legitimise itself and push its own agenda. The Zimbabwe electoral Commission (ZEC), for instance, appeared to be broadly representative but was, in fact, still dominated by ZANU-PF through their control of its secretariat and support staff. In addition, ZEC was starved of both material resources and manpower to carry out its tasks, and this has ensured that the partisan Registrar General's office remains in control of the election processes, from voter registration in the counting of the votes. " [49]

The above observation about the ZEC seems to be playing out at the moment, the lack of resources available to run this election is particularly startling, and will likely become a major issue in determining the outcome of the election.

Muzondidya explains just how stacked the GPA has been in ZANU-PF's favor:

'The ZANU-PF strategy, consistent with its hegemonic political culture, has been to engage in cosmetic political and economic reforms that will not result in further democracy or result in a loss of its historic monopoly over power. …Indeed, over the last four years, ZANU-PF has kept the strategic doors to its power, such as the security sector and the mining and agricultural industries, firmly closed." [50]

Muzondidya does not hold back, however, in his criticisms of the MDCs' performance. He gives a valuable analysis of the differences between the MDC-Tsvangirai and the MDC (formerly the MDC-M for Arthur Mutambara, then the MDC-N for Welshman Ncube, the current leader, and now simply the "MDC" under Ncube's leadership). Muzondidya outlines the major differences between the two MDCs and most importantly describes ethnic factionalism that has developed between the two MDCs and within the MDC-T. Those familiar with the history of political parties in Zimbabwe and in the African nationalist parties before Independence will recognize a depressing pattern of divisions around personalities, perceived "intelligence" differences within party leadership, and the ever-present ethnic solidarities that at times seem exaggerated yet over time become self-fulfilling. This chapter will be very helpful to those new to Zimbabwean politics wanting to make sense of the divisions between and within the MDCs.

Muzondidya also summarizes the corruption charges against MDC-T urban councilors that have grown in number over the past few years, showing the vulnerability of a group of leaders tasting power for the first time. While subsequently censored by the party, these cases have damaged the MDC-T's image as a party of "Change". Such cases included:

"the Chitungwiza land scandal which resulted in the party firing all its 23 councilors in 2010; the mismanagement and looting of Council land and resources by councilors in Bindura; the Kwekwe audit report findings of 2012 which unearthed serious financial irregularities involving the under-banking of collected revenue and the Marondera corruption case which resulted in the suspension of the mayor by his party in March 2012 for receiving kickbacks from companies and individuals in return for tenders. The corruption among the party's representatives in local authorities, MDC parliamentarians and government officials, as the MDC leadership itself has admitted, has the potential to cost the party dearly during the next elections." [57]

For those who built the coalition of trade unions and civics in the late 1990s that eventually created the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the MDCs, the last four years have more often been a disappointment as the links between these formative groups and the MDCs has been strained or broken by the MDCs' participation in government. Muzondidya concludes,

"ZANU-PF has, in fact, been more shrewd in its engagement with the transitional process than its political opponents, including both political parties and civics as well as international opponents such as the US and EU countries. It has been effectively using the transition arrangement to regroup and reorganise, and is now better organised than it was in 2009. " [59]

Chapter 3: Gerald Mazarire, "ZANU-PF and the Government of National Unity"

Historian Gerald Mazarire gives us a helpful contemporary history of the splits both in the MDC and ZANU-PF that many people outside of Zimbabwe may not fully understand. He starts by providing a summary of the somewhat questionable MDC and ZANU-PF versions of the story. Based on Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai's own account of it in his autobiography, Mazarire suggests that then South African President Thabo Mbeki, along with "the support of some Western embassies in Harare", had been involved in splitting the MDC in favor of Welshman Ncube's faction and ZANU-PF in favor of Emmerson Mnangagwa. This strategy ultimately failed in 2004 but it did lead to major conflicts in both parties. Mazarire explains that Mbeki returned to intervene in Zimbabwean politics during the violent crisis of 2008, and the resulting Unity Accord was "hurriedly concluded" by Mbeki so that he could "attend to a crisis at home that led, in September 2008, to his own ouster from the leadership of the ANC and the South African presidency." [73]

Mazarire then outlines ZANU-PF's version of the story, based mostly on Jonathan Moyo's writings, in which the GNU was carried out mostly to stop 'regime change' orchestrated from Washington and London, as the Security sector refused to go along with the MDC in declaring a government based on the original presidential election results. Mazarire then does an excellent job of showing how and why ZANU-PF managed to continue to dominate the GNU with strategies to keep the MDC out of key sectors of governance. In reference to ZANU-PF's "Pursuit of Hard Power", Mazirire writes:

"ZANU-PF's display of power is traceable to its ability to lose an election and stay in power. Starting with the delays in announcing the outcome of the March 2008 Presidential Election as opposed to the efficiency and speed with which the winner of the 27 June Presidential run-off was announced, ZANU was already at work to make sure that whatever arrangement would obtain thereafter should find them securely in position. Contrary to the view that ZANU-PF's arbitrary exercise of power and its assertiveness stem from increased confidence in the political and economic situation obtaining since the formation of the GNU, ZANU has always been determined to be a triumphant loser." [88]

Mazarire explores some of the areas where ZANU-PF insiders have excelled at enriching themselves at the expense of the state, and as an historian he can't help but point out the hypocrisy of this given ZANU-PF's earlier socialist rhetoric in a section labeled "ZANU-PF: from Socialism to Capitalism." Mazarire describes two main areas of this transition, namely the indigenisation and mining sectors. Pointing out as well that there were a key handful of white businessmen who have helped ZANU-PF insiders along the way to indigenization, he ends with respect for ZANU-PF Minister of Mines, Obert Mpufo, for his "almost single-handedly" winning the war against the "blood diamonds" charges from the Kimberley Process system. Mazirire's final advice to readers is worth contemplating as elections near. "Readers are starkly reminded that with ZANU-PF, literally anything is possible." [112]

Chapter 4: Bertha Chiroro, "Turning Confrontation into Critical Engagement: the Challenge of the Inclusive Government to Zimbabwean Civil Society"

This chapter by Betha Chiroro, a research specialist at the African Institute of South Africa in Pretoria, is essential for understanding the strained relations that have developed between the MDC parties and the civic organizations and NGOs that had been so supportive (and instrumental in forming) the MDCs in the first place. Chiroro is also the only contributor to address the fundamentally important role of women's organizations in the continued opposition to ZANU-PF authoritarian rule.

"An equally important sector is the female voice: as expressed by the Women's Coalition, (a network of women's rights activists with chapters in Bulawayo, Masvingo, Beitbridge, Gweru, Gwanda, Bindura, Marondera, and Mutare) and WOZA during the term of the IG. Although some have expressed their frustration that their participation is no more than 'tokenism and deception', Zimbabwean women have continued to strive for a democratic political environment together with other CSOs [Civil Society Organisations]." [128]

"Zimbabwean civil society's response to the IG [Inclusive Government] has continued to reveal ideological tensions between its human rights obligations and its need to deal with broader developmental requirements. Political advocacy around issues of human rights and violence often takes centre stage at the expense of developmental issues and issues of social and economic rights, rural development, poverty and inequality. While public service delivery remained very poor, with massive water and electricity shortages, poor waste management and poor sanitation remaining the order of the day, civil society has not made a clear and concerted effort to ensure that these issues are addressed by the IG." [136-137].

Chapter 5: Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Politics behind Politics: African Union, Southern African Development Community and the Global Political Agreement in Zimbabwe."

Historian Ndlovu-Gatsheni provides a very clear and useful contemporary history of African Union and SADC attempts to mediate the political crises in Zimbabwe since 2000. One is simultaneously impressed by the number of these continental and regional interventions as well as by the lack of substantive results. There is a lot of value here for understanding the 2013 elections. In particular, the current head of the AU, South African Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, has been outspokenly supportive of ZANU-PF's drive for elections in 2013, while South African President Jacob Zuma's lead SADC negotiator on Zimbabwe, Lindiwe Zulu, has recently come under heavy criticisms from Mugabe for her own stance that further reforms are necessary before elections could be held. Reading Ndlovu-Gatsheni's chapter will help make some of these differences clearer.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni's characterization of why GNU negotiations occurred offers a particularly helpful and succinct view:

"What led the political formations to negotiate were the stark political realities facing them: despite emerging victorious in the 29 March 2008 elections, the MDC political formations were prevented by ZANU-PF from ascending to power and its support base was exposed to unprecedented and unbearable violence. ZANU-PF clung to power by violence but its legitimacy was completely eroded. Added to this, the Zimbabwean economy continued to degenerate to its lowest ebb and international, continental, and regional pressure together with sanctions, contributed to ZANU-PF's decision to accept negotiations as the only game in town if it was to survive politically." [160]

Ndlovu-Gatsheni concludes his discussion of AU and SADC interventions:

"After 2008, the problem shifted from pushing for credible elections as a solution to the Zimbabwe problem to a search for a power-sharing arrangement in a context where there was no legitimate government in Harare. Currently, the Harare disputants have gone full circle to the issue of elections as a resolution of the Zimbabwe problem. This push for elections is taking place within a context in which SADC mediation and facilitation has lost momentum. The key facilitator is pre-occupied with local problems rocking the ANC, and ZANU-PF is taking advantage of the situation to push for elections before the completion of key reforms."

Chapter 6: Munyaradzi Nyakudya. "Sanctioning the Government of National Unity: A Review of Zimbabwe's Relations with the West in the Framework of the Global Political Agreement."

Historian Munyaradzi Nyakudya's chapter is an important one, especially as the Zimbabwe sanctions debate has been so contentious and often full of inaccuracies. Most importantly, Nyakudya details how ZANU-PF has effectively used the continuation of Western sanctions to its advantage during the GNU period. Nyakudya writes:

"The West has grappled with two scenarios: either to engage Mugabe, lift sanctions, and support the GNU, or to shun him completely and maintain, if not tighten the sanctions. The latter scenario has largely prevailed. It must be conceded that the US, EU and their allies' various Sanctions Bills all stipulated the need for tangible progress in terms of establishing democracy, respecting human rights and upholding the rule of law before re-engaging. There has simply been no such progress, with the reform deficit clearly still outstanding. ZANU-PF has persistently and consistently refused to implement critical electoral, judicial, media and security sector reforms necessary before new elections can be held. " [188]

Offering an insight into how determined ZANU-PF is to NOT carry out any reforms in the security sector, Nyakudya states:

"…on the issue of the security sector, the ZANU-PF Congress of December 2009 passed the following critical resolutions: 'ZANU (PF) as the party of revolution and the people's vanguard shall not allow the security forces to be the subject of any negotiation for a so-called security sector reform,' ostensibly because the 'security forces are a product of the liberation struggle'. The party thus argues that 'calls for security sector reform violate Zimbabwean sovereignty.' This simply throws spanners in the GPA implementation process: the MDC formations have vowed not to accept that general elections be held before security sector reforms are instituted, maintaining that the latter have been politicized, as revealed in their proclamations not to accept any leader without liberation war credentials." [190]

As elections approach and following the Constitutional referendum in March this year, the EU, Australia, and the US have stepped down from their hardline on targeted sanctions, removing many from the lists and promising even further lifting should these elections be peaceful and "credible". On the one hand this can be seen as assisting the MDCs in terms of letting them take credit for holding up their promise to work towards the lifting of sanctions. On the other hand, it also would appear to be a realpolitik hedging that ZANU-PF will win the elections and that Western powers are preparing for a full rapprochement with ZANU-PF in order to continue mining for platinum and dealing in diamonds there. The competition with China, who is fully involved with ZANU-PF on a number of economic and intelligence fronts, offers an incentive to back off on sanctions before the elections. Former US Ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young, travelled to Harare on the invitation of the State Department to visit Mugabe in April this year, which was a real sign of this hedging by the Americans, and even Reverend Jesse Jackson was in town on a "private" visit to meet with Mugabe and Tsvangirai, although he was accompanied by US Ambassador Bruce Wharton when meeting with Mugabe.

Chapter 7 Shari Eppel, "Repairing a Fractured Nation: Challenges and Opportunities in Post-GPA Zimbabwe"

Shari Eppel is a leading authority on transitional justice issues in Zimbabwe, particularly pertaining to the Gukurahundi period (1983-1987) when thousands of Zimbabweans were killed as part of ZANU's consolidation of power and the crushing of former rival ZAPU's power. Eppel is therefore highly qualified to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of truth and reconciliation efforts during the GPA, and in the future.

Like the other contributors to this volume, Eppel does not refrain from criticizing the opposition. In this case, she has in mind the difficulty observers sympathetic to the MDCs have in criticizing inter-party violence, as well as violence carried out by MDC supporters against ZANU-PF supporters.

"While the existence and extent of political violence by MDC in the last ten years remains an issue that civics in Zimbabwe is nervous to explore, at some point in the future it will be necessary to confront this issue if we are to avoid another cycle of impunity under an MDC government. The MDCs have undoubtedly had the odds stacked massively against them, with the police, army, and CIO all arresting, torturing and assaulting MDC supporters with impunity, as have war veteran groupings, you militia, Chipangano, and other informal arms of ZANU-PF. But on the ground in some rural villages and urban suburbs, inter-party violence has become much more evenly matched in recent years, and this is seldom admitted to by civics on the argument that the ZANU-PF elements of the state have dishonestly blamed much of their own violence on the MDC, and to produce forensic proof of some MDC violence would be to add credence to the patently false ZANU-PF position that most of the violence is by MDC." [234, emphasis in the original]… "Clearly, there are some people in Zimbabwe who are justified in seeing MDC supporters as perpetrators. Furthermore, members of the MDC faction headed by Welshman Ncube would point to internal violence in the MDC as a major contributor to the split in the party: beatings and torture of MDC's own activists have taken place in their political headquarters and structures over the years, as several—largely uncirculated—MDC commissions of inquiry reveal." [234].

Eppel also explores the roles of two new institutions developed by the GPA . The first is the Organ of National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) and the second is the GPA Joint Monitoring Committee (JOMIC), which is made up of representatives of all three political parties, and tasked with "investigating violent incidents together". (238) Eppel analyzes the potential value of the ONHRI while exploring some of the fundamental difficulties facing any institution in Zimbabwe wanting to seriously deal with issues of transitional justice. The ability of the JOMIC to not only monitor but prevent future political violence is questioned, and although all three political parties have been sanguine about JOMIC's abilities to make these upcoming elections "violence free", questions remain over how a JOMIC without enforceable powers will be able to act beyond making public pronouncements.

***

This book provides an important account of this crucial transitional period. Where the transition is headed is a question that many would like to know, but the book helps us understand the political conditions that are shaping the future.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland

"Donors go home!" Money and politics in African agriculture

By Susanna Thorp, WRENmedia / FAC

"Donors just go home!" was the strong call made in a session on the progress made by the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), 10 years after it was initiated. The progress made over the last decade, and what comes next, has been a recurring theme at the Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa conference.

"African economies are growing at 4-5% so they have plenty of fiscal resources. If donors pulled out, African governments would have to respond in investing more in agriculture." However, echoing arguments made by Adebayo Olukoshi in his opening address on Monday, the CAADP panel re-emphasised that even if more resources become available, this would not necessarily lead to more investment in agriculture. "Agriculture is seen as a potential black-hole," said Mandivamba Rukuni. "We have to convince our banks and ministries of finance that their support will trigger more wealth; that for every dollar invested, a return of two to three dollars will be achieved."

CAADP could create a space for dialogue where conditions are currently difficult, according to Rukuni. But, a decade on, the Programme needs a positive vision, passion and confidence in African history and practices.

African governments have been criticised for their lack of political will in investing more in agriculture, and for a gap between rhetoric and action. Can donors be accused of the same thing? After the food crisis of 2007/8, John Barrett of DFID admitted, in the morning session, that donors woke up to the fact that they had neglected agriculture and rural development for the past 10-15 years. “There was a tremendous renaissance around tackling food security,” Barrett said. “And our commitment to reverse decades of neglect culminated in the Aquila Declaration. It was the first time we had a commitment, a number and a target but the challenge is how to transform that into food on plates. Five years on it is important for us to examine what impact that has had.”

“CAADP could be the best thing that has happened to Africa,” said Bubu Khan, although some countries are better than others at implementing it – and learning from their mistakes. “CAADP is one framework that has African ownership. However it now needs a strong focus on women and youth and a more pragmatic response on climate change.” Colin Poulton expressed concern that whilst 40 CAADP compacts have now been developed in recent years, many of these exist only on paper in order to be donor compliant and have not been implemented. “More monitoring and evaluation for effective implementation is required.”

However, what progress can be made when, as Chance Kabaghe ex Minister of Zambia stated from his experience, that “politicians will always take advantage – so will technocrats. We start out well with the best of intentions but we now have to ask ourselves how we best get out of the situation.” Gem Argwings-Kodhek threw out a challenge to his peers in suggesting “perhaps we need to hear more from the politicians so we get to know what they really think so we can enter into a more effective dialogue, instead of just talking to one another.”

The FAO Voluntary Guidelines: setting sail?

Image: Fishing community members, Zambia from
theworldfishcenter's Flickr photostream (by-nc-nd)

Around our conference on the Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa, we are featuring a series of guest blogs.

This post is by Emmanuel Sulle, Researcher at the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS).

Amid the rapid acquisitions of tracts of land for production of food and energy feedstocks, and private forest plantations in developing countries in 2005-2009, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) launched the consultation process to develop Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Forests and Fisheries in the Context of National Food Security.

After a consultation process in 2009-10, the final Voluntary Guidelines (VG) are based on the consensus on internationally accepted practices that are already in place and were negotiated upon by governments, a broad range of civil society organizations and the private sector. The VGs are the first global 'soft law' instrument on the tenure of land, fisheries and forests. They were officially endorsed by the Committee on World Food Security on 11 May 2012. Their implementation is already encouraged by the United Nations General Assembly and the Francophone Assembly of Parliamentarians.

The question is: what now? Despite this high-level endorsement, the ways the Guidelines are implemented at local, national and regional level will vary widely, and will be keenly watched by those with an interest in land issues.

Regional discussions: what do States make of the guidelines?
On 12–14 February 2013, FAO brought together 78 professionals from Anglophone countries to a Technical Awareness Raising Workshop on the Voluntary Guidelines in Kigali, Rwanda. This was the second of 10 similar regional events planned by the FAO. The invitees were largely from government related departments (land, fisheries and forestry) and representatives from NGOs, farmers associations and land alliances of participating countries.

The general aims of the Voluntary Guidelines are to achieve food security for all and support sustainable efforts towards eradication of hunger and poverty. They are also meant to secure sustainable wellbeing, environmental protection and socio-economic development. The VGs are intended to act as a reference for improving the governance of land, fisheries and forest tenure around the globe.

In particular, the VGs address the issue of land. The Guidelines stress the need to have equal access to land, fisheries and forests among men and women, and the upholding of customary land rights, including the rights of minority groups. They aim to improve the weak governance system which marginalizes the poor, who often lose out due to the lack of political support necessary to influence decision-making processes.

Some states are recognizing the importance of these guidelines. Officiating at the FAO workshop in Kigali, Rwanda’s Minister for Natural Resources Hon. Stanislaus Kamazi stressed the need to have a strong participation in the implementation and monitoring of the VG in each participating State. He described Rwanda’s thorough land tenure reforms and progressive issuance of leasehold titles across the country. A participant from Zambia also underlined his country’s commitment to have transparent discussions and include land in the process of writing the new constitution. The Regional Representative for the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa said that there is a clear consensus that land and land-based resources are of great importance to any country. The backward and forward linkages throughout the economic sectors are crucial to sustainable development.

Ways forward: the role of research
In principle, the implementation of these guidelines lies in the heart of each Member State. However, each institution, whether an NGO, research institution and/or land rights organization, has a right to monitor and advocate for the implementation of the very guidelines which many of these organizations participated in crafting.

For example, my organisation – PLAAS – participated in the formulation and deliberation of these guidelines. As such, PLAAS has a role to play in monitoring the implementation of VG in different areas where it works. Its strategy involves working with research project partners in Sub-Saharan Africa. Currently, PLAAS is working with professionals from universities and NGOS in Malawi, Zambia, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Kenya to undertake studies on Commercialization of Land, and Land Grabbing, assessing the Implication for Land Rights and Livelihoods in Southern Africa. In each country, we are looking at how land deals are negotiated and implemented, and the possible impacts on different actors. The research seeks to identify the impacts of the large-scale investments to differentiated groups such as women and small scale farms.

The Future Agriculture Consortium and PLAAS will host a workshop for the Regional/SADC Policy Makers in June to discuss the Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa and strategies to implement and monitor the Voluntary Guidelines.

PLAAS will also analyze the impact of the VGs on land-based and fisheries governance initiatives in several countries where there are ongoing studies. As an institution with long experience on land issues in southern Africa, this could be a way for PLAAS to build the capacity of the local partners to develop their knowledge on the VGs and make use of it.

Security of tenure for small-scale fisherfolk
For a number of years PLAAS has been involved in a number of research projects into the tenure-based management of fisheries: Defragmenting Resource Management in Southern Africa (DARMA), Too Big To Ignore (TBTI), Cross-sectoral Commons Governance (CROSCOG), WELFARE, and the Worldwide Fisheries Co-management project. All projects aim at finding solutions towards the vexing question of how to strengthen tenure for communities towards fish resources in order to stop and reverse the decline in fish resources so that fisheries can continue providing wealth and livelihoods for fishing communities across generations.

In South Africa, small scale fisheries were largely undermined by the fisheries legislation of 1998, which gave rights to commercial, sport and subsistence fishing only. Upset by the legislation, Civil Society Organizations and activists joined forces to have the rights of small-scale fisheries recognized and protected by law. As the result of these concerted efforts, the High Court ordered the government to protect the rights of small scale fisheries and told it to work with them to formulate a policy, which emerged in 2012.

Into the future, PLAAS and its collaborating partners may want to investigate the success, constraints and recommend ways forward for the realization of these Guidelines by studying the ongoing land registration projects in countries like Botswana, Mozambique, Rwanda and Tanzania, to understand the differentiated impacts of these projects in different groups and contexts.

Challenges of implementing the Voluntary Guidelines
There are many challenges which might hinder the smooth implementation of the Guidelines. Here are just a few of them:

• State Sovereignty: As clearly stated, the VG are soft laws – they don’t override State Sovereignty and the existing policy, legal and institutional frameworks. As such, it is difficult to impose them on any country that may not be willing to implement them.
• Existing initiatives: The Voluntary Guidelines have entered a space occupied by existing guidelines, for example the Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa (developed by the African Union, African Development Bank and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa). For them to have specific influence, they must be integrated into such plans and being prioritized.
• Private sector commitment: One of the key stakeholders in the implementation of the VGs is the private sector, from investors to private developers. This was one of the issues of concern during the Rwanda workshop mentioned above, as their participation in the discussion of policy discourse has been absent or very minimal. 
• Funding for awareness raising, implementing and monitoring the VGs: Implementing these guidelines depends on the availability of resources such as funds and personnel. They will therefore sit on the shelf like many other documents, if the partners meant to implement them have no funding to disseminate, implement and monitor them.

Voluntary Guidelines: a vital tool to inform policy
Despite these challenges, these guidelines are a great tool for policy makers, researchers and advocacy institutions to use in their work around the tenure governance of land, fisheries and forests. To help this happen, a few activities should be considered:

• In each country, the FAO must launch this document in collaboration with the host country, in the presence of the CSOs, FBOs, and institutions dealing with land and fisheries rights, forests conservations and the research institutions such as universities. Out of this process, the country team for implementation, monitoring purposes needs to be established. CSOs dealing with the advocacy work on land tenure and rights may want to champion this process.
• The Guidelines provide an opportunity to influence policy making processes and/or amendments to law, to address issues of concern in the current legislation governing tenure of land, fisheries and forests. They need to be incorporated into the ongoing policy reforms in many African countries. There are clear examples where countries are adopting proposals made in the guidelines. Tanzania recently has announced a ‘land ceiling’ for foreign investments and it has limited the time such land can be owned.
• The Guidelines need to further inform discussions on pertinent issues to be included in national constitutions, particularly in countries where constitutions are being established, or where ongoing constitutional reform or review is taking place.
• Research and advocacy institutions need to produce relevant evidence and find ways to discuss it with policy makers and politicians, for example through policy briefings.

Decorating the Christmas tree with perfect Sustainable Development Goals?

By Katharina Welle, STEPS Centre PhD student

The 2013 STEPS Symposium on "credibility across cultures" examined questions surrounding 'best available' scientific advice in relation to global policy processes on sustainable development. One global process discussed at the Symposium is the current United Nations consultation process for setting new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs will form the core of a new global development agenda that will replace the current Millennium Development Goals after 2015.

While following the consultation process – as I did for water supply and sanitation – it becomes clear that the discussion rallies, unsurprisingly, on setting new targets and indicators. To the credit of sector stakeholders, the sector-internal consultations have picked up many of the criticisms voiced against the MDG on water and sanitation: its focus on technical aspects of access to water supply at the detriment of other key aspects encompassing the human right to water (and sanitation).

The consultation document submitted to the UN proposes targets and indicators related to equity, equality and non-discrimination, and the sustainability of services. So far so good, but what about the reality of monitoring and the traction these will have in the political reality of service delivery?

This takes me to some of the comments made by the speakers at the relevant STEPS Symposium session "From MDGs to SDGs: aspirations, evidence and diversity in setting global goals". For me, the points made by Duncan Green, Senior Strategic Advisor at Oxfam GB (who blogs here), stood out. He highlighted the politics of setting global targets, comparing the process with decorating a Christmas tree: everyone picks and chooses what she wants to see represented under the SDGs. The real challenge however, according to him, is how the post-MDG agenda will influence national policy making?

So, are the SDGs likely to make a difference? Will they be able to influence national level decision making? Paying attention to the politics of knowledge production and to its contested nature, a key theme in the Symposium, is helpful in answering this question.

For instance, when reading the latest official global figures on water supply access in Ethiopia, we learn that rural water access reached 34% in 2010.  However, when comparing these with figures released by the Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy, we find that official access figures for rural water supply for the same year were 65.8%. So, which figure is right? Is there even an objective figure that I could confidently quote? Attempting a quick answer one could say that much of the divergence between the figures boils down to using different data sources, different indicators and different methods of analysis. In other words, each actor chooses its inputs in appraising rural water access based on political pressures, professional biases, institutional capacity to collect data etc.

The picture that emerges from such insights is starkly different from the seemingly objective reporting of progress against the global development targets: rather, monitoring can be likened to a theatre play where different actors stage performances that reflect their interests and political affiliations.

In Duncan Green's words it is "politics and power" that lie at the heart of global monitoring regardless of how inclusive the formulation of the new SDGs are going to be. Monitoring is infinitely manipulable – and therefore it is worth paying attention to the power and political dynamics in local monitoring settings rather than stopping short at the formulation of the 'perfect' target to decorate the SDG Christmas tree. 

This article was originally posted on the The Crossing.

Crossing swords over science

Kendo practice / gratapictures / Flickr (cc-by-nc)

By Nathan Oxley, STEPS Centre

Why do words matter in the politics of science? The topic of language kept coming back again and again at the STEPS Symposium on evidence, uncertainty and science advice. It isn't about arguing over semantics: words are bound up in how we think, negotiate and debate possible ways to address problems like climate change, biodiversity loss and food insecurity.

They know about this in Germany. As Jan Marco Müller (European Commission) told us, the word "Alternativlos" (an adjective indicating that no alternative exists to a given course of action) was named "Unwort des Jahres" – least favourite word of the year – in 2011. That's understandable. It's a word designed to stifle argument, to be slipped in to policy discussions (including those involving science) to close down alternative views.

It's tempting to view words as a neutral tool to describe reality: but there are signs that the language we use can have real and lasting impacts on how people behave and make decisions. Even words like 'evidence' and 'risk' can mean different things to different people.

One way to combat the tendency to close down debate might be to create spaces where more voices can be included. Even in these spaces, though, debate can be narrowed. In a recent blog post for UEA's 3S programme, Maud Borie analyses the mechanism of "opening the floor" at sessions of the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES). It's a fascinating insight into the physical, visual aspect of consensus-making. As participants take turns to speak, the microphone becomes a highly symbolic part of a "ritualised process" (Borie's words). In another blog post, she shows how a Microsoft Word document is displayed on a big screen and edited to create a consensus. In the quest for a common goal, differences of opinion are gradually and effectively deleted.

What do we want? Respectful
Discourse. When do we want it?
Now / cactusbones /
Flickr (cc-by-nc-sa)

This doesn't mean we should trash the IPBES, and other big scientific assessments like it. Without doubt, there is a genuine desire to include a diversity of voices. Prof Sir Robert Watson, talking at the Symposium about Future Earth, outlined an admirably broad vision of working at multiple scales with many voices represented. The challenge is how to reflect many views in the outcomes of the process, though the intention to include, listen and learn from many sources is clear.

But it's almost inevitable that codified, ritualised forms of engagement emerge in such super-large, organised, multi-stakeholder processes. After all, they also emerge at much smaller scales: for example, hand signal systems for debates used by protest movements can risk leading to dominant voices and "groupthink" taking over, despite their non-hierarchical aims ("silence–and/or the absence of any form of jazz hands–is generally viewed as a sign of agreement"). Nevertheless, these codified and formalised methods are often the best thing to hand when a decision has to be made.

What does this mean for science and decision-making? If anything, it should make us approach inclusive and deliberative processes with a questioning mind. Are they really what they first seem?

In his closing lecture to the Symposium, Prof Alan Irwin likened the ritualised nature of public engagement to the Japanese martial art Kendo. Yes, it is a ritual, he said, but it has value – it's a way for people to interact within a framework, whatever the limitations.

An understanding of these limitations – and of the hidden power of words – could help scientists, politicians and others to negotiate more openly and with more humility.

This article was originally posted on the The Crossing.

STEPS Symposium 2013: Beyond Rio+20 - Improving global structures for scientific advice

Lidia Brito.
Photo: Lance Bellers

Guest blog by Ruth Segal, Doctoral Researcher, SPRU
 
In recent years, global initiatives have attempted to co-ordinate scientific advice and assessments – on climate change, biodiversity and agriculture, among other topics. The second day of the STEPS Symposium on the global politics of scientific advice opened with a panel looking at these global structures.

Prof Ian Scoones, co-director of the STEPS Centre, introduced the session by asking how assessments should be organised; who is included, who decides and what are the underlying politics?

The two panellists, Prof Lidia Brito, director of UNESCO's science policy division, and Prof Sir Robert Watson, former Chief Scientific Advisor for DEFRA, drew from their extensive experience to address the question of what makes for effective and successful international engagement between scientific advice and policy making.

The two presentations were very different in style, and presented different approaches to building effective structures for scientific advice. Prof Brito focused on the importance of ensuring that science and policy address societal needs, which, she said must be at the heart of any process.  She stressed that processes should connect the three worlds of policy formation, scientific enquiry and societal need. In order to do this, openness and engagement were vital to "multiply faces and amplify voices". Scientific evidence should be embedded in all stages of a process, rather than just included at the end in advice to policy makers, she said.

Prof Brito also stressed that policy processes should include capacity building, as scientific capacity is not equally distributed. Countries are not equally able to participate in policy processes, reinforcing hidden power relations. Power dynamics also come into play when examining what issues are covered in the processes, whose questions are addressed, and what forms of knowledge are included as evidence.

Bob Watson.
Photo: Lance Bellers

Prof Watson's address combined a barrage of both science and Powerpoint slides. And, as would be expected from an audience made up of the great and good of the science policy and STS worlds, the questions and responses were incisive and illuminating.

Prof Watson outlined the experiences and lessons learned from several processes, including IAASTD and IPCC; and discussed two processes still under development: IPBES (Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services) and the Future Earth project.

He described the key factors for a successful process, highlighting the need for processes to be open and involve a balanced range of stakeholders who are able to work together to co-design and co-produce the outputs. Ownership and participation were vital, he said, as are evidence-based outputs, which can be peer-reviewed.  Global assessment processes must be multi-disciplinary and focus on the needs of society, he said, stressing the importance of stakeholder engagement, co-production and trans-disciplinary working.

Questions from the floor focused on knowledge – whose, what sorts, and where international assessments look for knowledge; how power relations are taken into account when using knowledge from different communities; how 'expertise' is defined; capacity building; and the politics of knowledge production.  A concern was raised that the questions of interest to communities at the grassroots may not be those being asked by international panels; how can these be incorporated but not subsumed into a single consensus?
There was a concern from one delegate that the talk of openness and participation can at times be nothing more than rhetoric. A nother raised the legitimacy of the 'indigenous' representatives participating in the processes: how are they selected and who does the selecting?

The session raised many questions about the value and purpose of global assessments, but did not, in my view, wholly manage to grapple with questions of power and politics in global deliberations. The perspectives of marginal communities in developing countries remained marginal to the discussion of assessing global linkages across multiple sectors.

Many of these questions are about how to include, and reflect, more views in global scientific processes. How can rhetoric about inclusiveness be turned into a real attempt to look at questions about what sort of expertise is included? Who are the participants in global processes? Are they just part of the international development juggernaut - the same people talking to each other in multiple fora? There was a call for policy solutions to address the needs of stakeholders, but who defines who the stakeholders are? The presentations demonstrated a huge ambition to link global issues, but how do they make an impact on people's daily lives?

If the theme of the session was how to design open and accountable decision-making processes and how they might use science effectively, the discussion raised many questions about whether these huge global assessment processes are open or accountable, who is involved in making the decisions, how the issues to be examined are chosen, how the questions are framed, what is considered to be scientific evidence, and much more.

The session raised more questions than it answered, but as Prof Brito had suggested that scientists should be interested in conflict stimulation – continually questioning evidence and understandings – perhaps that was appropriate.

To view resources, video, commentary and slides from the event, visit the Symposium page on the STEPS Centre website. 

STEPS Symposium 2013: Science and developing countries - whose expertise counts?

Dipak Gyawali at the symposium.
Photo: Lance Bellers

Guest blog by Rachael Taylor, PhD student, SPRU

The second session of the STEPS Symposium on the global politics of scientific advice asked 'whose expertise counts?'

In his opening comments, Professor Brian Wynne (University of Lancaster) turned this question around by asking "whose questions count?" He described how sheep farmers in the UK asked relevant questions of scientific advisers and made observations following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster (as discussed in his paper from 1992). Prof Wynne explained that in this context the questions and observations from farmers were largely ignored by scientists.

This analogy made me think of farmers in a very different, developing-world context. Small-holder farmers in developing countries frequently have few channels through which they can question, critique, or respond to science or policy. In these contexts, policy is prescriptive. While some participatory development projects aim to involve local communities in identifying issues and determining policy, cases where this is being successfully implemented are far outnumbered by cases where there is no such project.

The issues surrounding local, indigenous expertise in a developing country context were only briefly raised during this session. Dr Dipak Gyawali (Nepal Academy of Science and Technology) spoke about the need for more 'toad eye' science and less 'eagle eye' science (his slides are here). Though this acknowledges that scientific expertise can come from places outside of academia, his discussion did not elaborate on the challenges this presents to hierarchies and how academia and the policy arena can engage with this.

Dr Alice Bell (SPRU, University of Sussex) spoke about the role of the public as experts in a developed world context. She suggested that social media tools such as Twitter can act as a tool to mobilise the public in challenging scientific advice (see also her earlier post on this blog). During her presentation (slides here) my thoughts again turned to how this may be reflected in a developing country context where access to social media is less widely available, especially in rural areas. For example, could local radio, widely used throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, could play a role in the vocalisation of public opinion regarding science and policy debates?

Policy and science in developing countries often come from, or are heavily influenced by developed countries, especially those with colonial links. It is worth considering whether it is harder for developing countries to critique or dispute science from developed countries, or to question the 'authority' assigned to scientists in developed countries.

Later in the day, in her keynote lecture, Anne Glover (Chief Scientific Adviser to the President, European Commission) used the example of genetically modified (GM) crops to illustrate this problem. She explained that if European countries refuse to use GM crops, developing countries would also refuse them (slides here). This example highlights the influence of hierarchies from north to south. In the case of GM crops, developing countries have the potential to benefit most from growing them, according to Prof Glover, and they are often cited as a 'fix' for increasing food production in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is for reasons such as these that those engaged with development, science and policy arenas must challenge hierarchies of authority, expertise and influence.

Discussions around authority of expertise and whose expertise counts centred on UK and western science and policy systems, and not those of developing countries. Where the context and systems are so different, understanding whose expertise and questions count is a complex issue: but it's arguably a more important challenge because of population and economic growth in developing countries. To me, surrounded by such eminent academics, these issues were under-addressed throughout this session.

Though questions regarding 'whose expertise counts?' in a developing country context was under-represented in this session, they were referred to. Issues regarding 'whose questions count', however, as raised in the opening remarks of the session, were not touched on. In sessions the following day, Professor Lidia Brito (UNESCO) and Dr Camilla Toulmin (International Institute for Environment and Development) both referred to 'who is asking the questions?' Throughout all of the Symposium's five sessions, however, no one attempted to adequately respond to this.

To view resources, video, commentary and slides from the event, visit the Symposium page on the STEPS Centre website.